Cryptographic Primitives from Physical Variables by Hammouri, Ghaith
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Digital WPI
Doctoral Dissertations (All Dissertations, All Years) Electronic Theses and Dissertations
2009-06-02
Cryptographic Primitives from Physical Variables
Ghaith Hammouri
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/etd-dissertations
This dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by Digital WPI. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations (All
Dissertations, All Years) by an authorized administrator of Digital WPI. For more information, please contact wpi-etd@wpi.edu.
Repository Citation
Hammouri, G. (2009). Cryptographic Primitives from Physical Variables. Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/etd-
dissertations/304
Cryptographic Primitives from Physical Variables
by
Ghaith Hammouri
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty
of the
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in
Computer Engineering
May, 2009
Approved:
Prof. Berk Sunar
ECE Department
Dissertation Advisor
Prof. Christof Paar
ECE Department
Ruhr-University of Bochum
Prof. William J. Martin
Department of Mathematical
Sciences
Prof. Daniel J. Dougherty
Department of Computer
Science
Prof. David Cyganski
ECE Department
Prof. Fred J. Looft
ECE Department Head
For my parents,
my wife
and my son.
I love you all.
Abstract
In this dissertation we explore a new paradigm emerging from the subtleties of cryp-
tographic implementations and relating to theoretical aspects of cryptography. This new
paradigm, namely physical variables (PVs), simply describes properties of physical objects
designed to be identical but are not due to manufacturing variability.
In the first part of this dissertation, we focus our attention on scenarios which require
the unique identification of physical objects and we show how Gaussian PVs can be used to
fulfill such a requirement. Using this framework we present and analyze a new technique for
fingerprinting compact discs (CDs) using the manufacturing variability found in the length
of the CDs’ lands and pits. Although the variability measured is on the order of 20 nm, the
technique does not require the use of microscopes or any advanced equipment. Instead, the
electrical signal produced by the photo-detector inside the CD reader will be sufficient to
measure the desired variability. We thoroughly investigate the new technique by analyzing
data collected from 100 identical CDs and show how to extract a unique fingerprint for each
CD.
In the second part, we shift our attention to physically parameterized functions (PPFs).
Although all the constructions we provide are centered around delay-based physically un-
clonable functions (PUFs), we stress that the use of the term PUF could be misleading as
most circuits labeled with the term PUF are in reality clonable on the protocol level. We
argue that using a term like PPFs to describe functions parameterized by a PV is a more
accurate description. Herein, we thoroughly analyze delay-PUFs and use a mathematical
framework to construct two authentication protocols labeled PUF-HB and HB+PUF. Both
these protocols merge the known HB authentication family with delay-based PUFs. The
new protocols enjoy the security reduction put forth by the HB portion of the protocol and
at the same time maintain a level of hardware security provided by the use of PUFs. We
present a proof of concept implementation for HB+PUF which takes advantage of the PUF
circuit in order to produce the random bits typically needed for an HB-based authentication
scheme. The overall circuit is shown to occupy a few thousand gates. Finally, we present a
new authentication protocol that uses 2-level PUF circuits and enables a security reduction
which, unlike the previous two protocols, stems naturally from the usage of PVs.
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Chapter 1
Why Physical Variables?
Over the past few years an increasing number of results have targeted the use of
physical variables in cryptography. These variables are in essence very similar to
biometric modalities in humans. While biometric modalities are typically used to
uniquely identify specific individuals, physical variables can be used to uniquely iden-
tify physical objects such as circuits, compact discs (CDs), papers, etc. In this work,
the term physical variables (PVs) refers to variables which describe certain proper-
ties of a physical object. Due to manufacturing variability, even identical objects are
expected to have a slightly different value for their PV. A simple example of a PV
is the length of wires inside an integrated circuit. Even though identical circuits are
designed to have the same exact wire length, in reality two circuits will most likely
differ in their wire length. Different PVs have been used to uniquely identify various
objects ranging from expensive merchandise to integrated circuits [28, 38, 19, 17, 15].
These new exciting results open the door to the exploration of various cryptographic
applications which could benefit from the use of PVs.
In this dissertation we examine four advantages that can be gained from using
PVs in cryptographic applications.
Unique identification of physical objects: The ability to achieve a secure
1
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method of identifying physical objects would significantly limit counterfeiting; a prob-
lem which, according to the US chamber of commerce, costs the US economy USD
250 billion yearly. A number of recent results have used PVs to produce unique
fingerprints for different physical objects (see, for example, [38, 19, 15]). Although
these results are quite recent, using PVs to produce unique access cards was proposed
decades ago by Bauder and Simmons from Sandia National Labs [5]. More recently,
the work by Ravikanth Pappu on physical one-way functions [83] has reignited this
area of research and stimulated a large number of related results. Another notable
work in the field is that of Tuyls et al. in [96]. In their book, these authors present a
comprehensive collection of articles on noisy data which include a number of results
relating to the unique identification of physical objects. One of our interests in this
dissertation will be to quantify the identification capability of PVs under specific as-
sumptions on their distribution. We will also present a specific example where PVs
can be used to uniquely identify compact discs (CDs).
Lightweight implementations: Although PVs are typically used for their abil-
ity to uniquely identify physical objects, they also seem to offer a cheap resource that
can be utilized for cryptographic purposes. The area of lightweight cryptographic
design has seen quite an impressive boom in the past few years (see, e.g., [23, 52]
and the references therein). One of the most popular techniques used to reduce
the size of hardware implementations is to serialize classical cryptographic protocols
[24, 51, 82, 66]. Although these results are exciting, the approach itself seems to
be inherently limited. In general, most classical cryptographic protocols were de-
signed with little attention paid to their hardware implementation. Indeed, not all
such protocols lend themselves to serialization; alternative approaches are required.
From a broader perspective, the notion of taking classical protocols and attempting
to squeeze them into smaller circuits seems to eventually come up against natural lim-
itations. A different, yet equally exciting approach, is to explore new protocols which
3are designed to be lightweight in nature. A few examples of such new lightweight
constructions are given in [11, 70, 45, 90]. These proposals are mostly block ciphers
which focus on reducing the gate count but do not address tamper-resilience or com-
putational hardness. However, the approach itself seems promising in principle. As
we will see in later chapters, PVs can offer a natural approach to lightweight and
secure implementations. In essence, one can build cryptographic primitives which
use the PV value as a parameter. As PVs assume real values, they facilitate the con-
struction of functions which are parameterized with real values, without having to
incur the expensive cost of storing real values. All that would be needed to utilize the
PV in some cryptographic function is to find a mechanism to extract the PV value.
In this dissertation we explore this approach and present a number of cryptographic
primitives parameterized by PVs and which can be implemented with a significantly
low number of gates.
Tamper resilience: While typical cryptographic protocols might be very secure
in theory, one has to take into account attacks which exploit so called side-channel
attacks [63, 62] directly targeting the implementation. These attacks are roughly clas-
sified into two groups. Passive attacks solely observe side-channels (e.g. computation
time, power consumption, electromagnetic emanation, temperature fluctuation, etc.,
i.e. PVs) to deduce internal secrets from leaked side-channel profiles. In contrast,
with active attacks the attacker may also inject faults during the computation [64]
or manipulate the hardware in other ways. Not surprisingly, active attacks are more
powerful and are more difficult to prevent. A tamper-resilient hardware design is
vital in securing devices from both passive and active side-channel attacks. To detect
active side-channel attacks a number of linear [30, 31] and non-linear robust coding
techniques [32] have been proposed. While linear coding techniques bear little over-
head, they provide protection only against random errors. A more able attacker, who
can choose errors, can only be stopped by non-linear robust codes. Unfortunately,
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these methods also incur significant overhead, i.e. roughly more than 100%. At the
time of this writing, robust codes seem to be the best candidate for error detection.
As such, in this work we highlight some of the PVs benefits in preventing active
attacks against hardware.
Computational security: Any cryptographic primitive is in need of some se-
curity assurance. These assurances usually come in the form of security reduction
to known computationally difficult problems. The problem, however, is that crypto-
graphic primitives which do posses these security assurances are usually not natural to
the hardware and are therefore quite demanding in terms of resources. In constrained
environments, where only lightweight implementations are allowed, building these
primitives becomes a challenge. The question we try to answer here is whether there
exists computationally difficult problems that are naturally supported by hardware
implementations. A number of recent results have provided quite elegant solutions
to this problem (see, for example, [46, 50, 33, 53]). In this work we further develop
these results and at the same time present new cryptographic primitives which utilize
PVs in order to provide hard problems which can be efficiently implemented.
1.1 Dissertation Outline
In this dissertation we strive to achieve two main goals.
• First, to explore the ability of PVs to uniquely identify devices under certain
assumptions.
• Second, to explore new cryptographic applications of PVs and to highlight the
advantages gained from using a PV in these applications.
Each of these goals will be addressed in one of the two parts making up this disser-
tation.
1.1. DISSERTATION OUTLINE 5
1.1.1 Physical Variables and Fingerprinting
The main theme of this part of the dissertation will be a high level view of PVs with
an emphasis on their ability to uniquely identify or fingerprint physical objects.
In Chapter 2 we review some previous work on PVs and on fingerprinting. Fur-
thermore, we show when a Gaussian PV can be used to identify physical objects. We
also review how to generate a repeatable fingerprint for each physical object under
certain assumptions.
In Chapter 3 we introduce a new technique for extracting unique fingerprints from
identical CDs. The proposed technique takes advantage of manufacturing variability
found in the length of the CDs’ lands and pits which will be the PV used in this
chapter. Although the variability measured is on the order of 20 nm, the technique
does not require the use of microscopes or any advanced equipment. Instead, the
electrical signal produced by the photo detector inside the CD reader will be sufficient
to measure the desired variability. We thoroughly investigate this new technique by
analyzing data collected from 100 identical CDs and show how to extract a unique
fingerprint from each CD. We also give specific parameters and code constructions to
convert the derived fingerprints into 128-bit cryptographic keys. Finally, we outline
a simple protocol which utilizes the CD fingerprint to provide IP protection for the
software stored on the CD.
1.1.2 Applications of Physically Parameterized Functions
In this part of the dissertation we shift our attention to physically parameterized
functions (PPFs). Simply stated, PPFs are functions that use PVs as parameters.
A special case of PPFs are physically unclonable functions (PUFs) which will be the
center of our discussion in this part of the dissertation.
In Chapter 4 we throughly explore delay-based PUFs and their different construc-
tions. The main job of this chapter will be to set the stage for PUFs before we can
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use them in a number of cryptographic schemes.
In Chapter 5 we merge the delay-PUF along with the HB based authentication
protocol to produce PUF-HB; a hybrid protocol that enjoys the advantages of both
schemes while improving the level of security. The proposed authentication scheme
observes a level of tamper resilience, while at the same time being provably secure
against active attacks in the detection based model. In addition, the presented proto-
col resists the man-in-the-middle attacks proposed so far for the HB+ scheme. From
the PUF perspective, PUF-HB is the first PUF based authentication scheme with
a security reduction. From the HB perspective, PUF-HB is the first hardware HB
implementation with tamper resilience properties.
In Chapter 6 we present a proof of concept implementation for HB+PUF, a vari-
ant of the PUF-HB. The HB+PUF protocol enjoys the same properties of PUF-HB
with a much simpler security reduction. Our implementation takes advantage of the
PUF circuit in order to produce the random bits typically needed for an HB-based
authentication scheme. Note that the existence of a random number generator (RNG)
is assumed in all HB-based protocols without taking into account the complexity of
such device. The overall circuit is shown to occupy on the order of a few thousand
gates. Note that this is considered a benchmark for lightweight implementations.
This small gate count is achieved by using the tristate PUF and by serializing the
operations.
In Chapter 7 we show that delay-PUFs alone can be used to create a secure
challenge response authentication scheme. We present a new primitive, namely 2-
level PUFs which allow for a reduction to a special class of a threshold of majority
gates under the uniform distribution. Furthermore, we explore extensions of PUFs
to produce efficient n-to-n mappings.
It is important to note that our discussion on PVs will not be specifically con-
cerned with aging effects. While this is quite an important topic to be studied when
1.2. EDITORIAL NOTE 7
addressing PVs it be beyond the scope of this dissertation.
1.2 Editorial Note
Each chapter will include its own related work. We will be using standard notation
for all our work, any specific terms or concepts will be explained when they first
appear in a chapter.
Many of the results in this dissertation have previously appeared in published
papers. All the results are joint work with my adviser, Professor Berk Sunar. Chapter
2 contains some results which have not been submitted for review. The results of
Chapter 3 are joint work with professor Aykutlu Dana from the institute of material
science and technology at Bilkent University and will appear in [40]. The results of
Chapters 4 and 7 are joint work with Erdinc¸ O¨ztu¨rk and have appeared in [78, 79, 42].
The results of Chapter 6 are joint work with Berk Birand and Erdinc¸ O¨ztu¨rk and
have appeared in [41]. Finally the results of Chapter 5 have appeared in [43]. Other
related work of mine, which is not part of this dissertation, includes results on the
usage of PUFs in finite state machines which is joint work with Kahraman Akdemir
[39].
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Part I
Physical Variables and
Fingerprinting
9
10
Chapter 2
PVs and Fingerprinting
Physical variables (PVs) can be viewed as a description of some property in a physi-
cal object. The essential idea behind PVs is that although some physical objects are
manufactured to be identical, some of their properties will be different due to manu-
facturing variability. When these properties can be described using a numeric value,
we can model the value of the PV as a random variable sampled from some probabil-
ity distribution. Our goal in this chapter will be to show when certain types of PVs
can be used to uniquely identify physical objects. In order to achieve this goal, we
will restrict our attention to PVs with values sampled from a Gaussian distribution1.
We will also model noise in the measured PV value as additive Gaussian noise. This
view of a Gaussian PV with Gaussian noise should be quite useful and common for
two main reasons. First, Gaussian distributions are typically used to describe natural
phenomena. Second, the Central Limit Theorem states that any variable which is the
sum of a large number of independent and identically distributed variables is likely
to be a Gaussian [80]. In fact, all the PVs which we will address in this dissertation
will be treated as independent Gaussian random variates with measurements subject
to independent additive Gaussian noise.
1We will use the terms Gaussian distribution and Normal distribution interchangeably.
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Another important concept which we review in this chapter is that of fuzzy extrac-
tors. Even when it is possible to uniquely identify physical objects, it is not clear if
it will also be possible to generate a unique fingerprint for the physical object. Every
time a PV is measured, its value will be accompanied by a level of noise. Therefore,
a fingerprint generated from a PV value is also expected to change every time the
PV is measured. To solve this problem, fuzzy extractors were introduced. The main
job of a fuzzy extractor is to use the PV value to generate a fingerprint which can
be regenerated from a noisy version of the PV value. Therefore, fuzzy extractors can
guarantee the generation of a fixed fingerprint for each physical object.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we
discuss some of the previous work related to PVs and fingerprinting. Section 2.2
introduces PVs and sets the stage for using them to fingerprint physical objects.
Section 2.3 addresses discretization techniques for PVs and shows when Gaussian
PVs can be used to uniquely identify physical objects. Finally, in Section 2.4, we
review fuzzy extractors.
2.1 Previous Work
Over the past years, several research papers have focused on using biometrics to
uniquely identify humans, a lot of the techniques introduced in these papers can be
applied for usage in fingerprinting physical devices. A thorough study on these various
techniques and connections has been provided by Tuyls et. al in their book “Security
with Noisy Data” [96]. In their book, the authors explore various techniques used in
biometrics and physical devices in order to prevent counterfeiting and illegal access
to secret information. As our interest is mainly directed towards physical objects, we
will focus our attention on work done in that particular area.
One of the earlier work related to (PVs) was presented by Ravikanth Pappu in his
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PhD thesis [83]. The main focus of his work was to define and explore physical one-
way functions (POWF). The motivation for POWF is to provide a one-way function
which depends on PVs and measurement probes such that the retrieval of the PV
value or the probe’s configuration is difficult to carryout using computational means
or physical interactions.
Another concept which is also dependent upon PVs is that of physically unclonable
functions (PUFs) [29, 71]. PUFs are a natural successor of POWFs and are therefore
very similar to them. The idea behind PUFs is to build physical devices which
compute a function such that an adversary cannot clone the device or deduce the
implemented function. Unfortunately, due to the popularity of the name, several
physical functions which do not satisfy the unclonability property have been labeled as
PUFs. In this work we argue that the term physically parameterized function (PPFs)
is a more accurate description for these functions. In Part II of this dissertation we
will talk extensively about PUFs.
One of the central motivations to build physical functions is to be able to uniquely
identify different physical objects. Some recent proposals directly use PVs to gener-
ate a unique fingerprint for different devices. In [3] a circuit fingerprinting technique
was introduced. The technique exploits manufacturing variability in integrated chips
to detect Trojan circuits inserted during the manufacturing process. The PV used
for this technique is the power consumption of the fingerprinted circuit. Another se-
cure fingerprinting technology named RF-DNA was developed by Microsoft Research
[19]. The RF-DNA technology provides unique and unclonable physical fingerprints
based on the subtleties in the device’s reaction when subjected to an electromagnetic
wave. The PV used here is the device’s response when subjected to electromagnetic
waves. The fingerprints are used to produce a cryptographic certificate of authen-
ticity (COA), which when associated with a high value good, may be used to verify
the authenticity of the goods and to distinguish it from counterfeit goods. Another
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application of manufacturing variability is fingerprinting paper objects. In [17] the
authors propose laser surface authentication where a high resolution laser microscope
is used to capture the paper texture, from which a PV is derived and a fingerprint
is developed. In a more recent proposal, a cheap commodity scanner was used to
identify paper documents [15]. While most of the results cited above were developed
in the last decade, the idea of using physical fingerprints to obtain security primitives
is not new at all. Access cards based on physically unclonable properties of media
were proposed decades ago by Bauder and Simmons from Sandia National Labs [5].
In Chapter 3 we will present a technique to fingerprint CDs from the length of the
lands and pits used to store the information on the CD.
These examples use different types of PVs to identify physical objects. For the
remainder of this chapter we will not be concerned with what the PV represents but
will rather focus our attention on the PV distribution.
2.2 PVs
As we mentioned in the beginning of this chapter PVs can be viewed as a description
of some property in a physical object. The idea behind PVs is that although some
physical objects are manufactured to be identical, some of their properties will be
different due to manufacturing variability. Any manufacturing process will undergo
a number of external effects which typically cause variation in the physical objects
produced. In fact, trying to eliminate this type of variability is a challenging task
which has received much attention from the research community (see, for example,
[81, 1]). A simple example of manufacturing variability can be seen in the length of
wires inside any integrated-chip (IC). As these wires are made out of a number of
atoms, it is common that the same wire (at the design level) will have a different
number of atoms (and therefore different length) from one chip to another. Of course
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when the variance in the wire’s length is low, its effect on the circuit’s behavior is
unnoticeable. The manufacturing process research is usually concerned with large
manufacturing variability which can have detrimental results on the overall perfor-
mance of the physical object. In this dissertation we are mainly interested in the
type of manufacturing variability which is not harmful to the functionality of the
physical object. Therefore, we work under the assumption that the physical object is
functional.
In order to be able to reason about PVs we model a PV as a random variable
X ∈ R with some probability distribution H over the reals. Every physical object
manufactured from some design D will have a different PV value. Therefore, we view
a physical object as a sample from the distribution H. We use ψ(D) to denote the
set of all physical objects which are manufactured from some design D, and we say
that X is a PV for ψ(D). Now every physical object Sj ∈ ψ(D) will have a an ideal
PV value Xˆj. We will slightly abuse the notation and use Sj ∈H ψ(D) to denote
drawing a physical object Sj from ψ(D) such that Xˆj is chosen according to H. We
also use S1, . . . , Sk ∈H ψ(D) to denote that Xˆ1, . . . , Xˆk were drawn independently
according to H. Here, we used Xˆj to denote the ideal value of X in Sj. However, as
the measurement of X will contain noise we use Xj to denote a measurement of Xˆj.
We also model Xj ∈ R as a random variable with some probability distribution Dj
over the reals. Notice that every physical object Sj will determine the ideal value of
the PV and the noise distribution Dj.
A natural extension of the above model is for the physical object to have multiple
PVs. With this view we treat X as a vector in Rn. Each physical object Sj ∈ ψ(D)
will have an ideal PV value Xˆj ∈ Rn. The ith entry (coordinate) of Xˆi will have
an ideal value Xˆij ∈ R and can be modeled as a random variable following the dis-
tribution Hi. Here, we are making the assumption that the distributions Hi are
independent. In reality there will always be a level of dependency between these dis-
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tributions. However, we make this assumption in order to simplify our analysis. The
measurement of the ith entry of Xˆj on some physical object Sj will be an independent
sample from the distribution Dij. We will be using a single subscript to mean a vector
containing the values of all the entries of X in a specific physical object (eg. Xj), and
double subscripts Xij to be the value of the i
th entry of Xj. We also call n the size
of the PV. Now when we use the notation S1, . . . , Sk ∈H ψ(D) we mean that the ith
entry of each vector Xˆ1, . . . , Xˆk was drawn independently according to Hi. Because
the distributions Hi are independent, the multivariate distribution H over Rn will be
H =∏ni=1Hi.
With this model we can now reason about distributions rather than physical ob-
jects. It is important to note here that the above is an idealized model. For example,
when we consider continuous distributions we are implying that ψ(D) contains an
infinite number of objects which is clearly not the case. Although we will be using an
idealized model to derive some of our equations, we will see in the next chapter that
the model closely predicts some of the experimental results.
Before we finish this section we discuss what we mean by the ability to uniquely
identify physical objects. We first introduce the following definition. We say that a
function ∆ on some set S is a semi-pseudo distance if ∆ : S × S → R+ = [0,∞) and
for any elements a, b ∈ S, ∆(a, b) = ∆(b, a) and ∆(a, a) = 0. The reader should note
that what we refer to as a semi-pseudo distance function is a distance metric without
the triangle inequality and with a weaker notion of identity. In general, there are a
number of functions which are weaker than a distance metric, yet they share some of
the properties of a distance metric [89]. The semi-pseudo distance is a mix between a
semi-metric which does not require the triangle inequality and a pseudo metric which
allows non-identical elements to have distance 0. One other technical term which we
need is that of negligible functions. We say that a function f(n) : N→ R is negligible
if for every positive polynomial p(x) there exists some N0 ∈ N such that for all n > N0
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we have f(n) < 1
p(n)
[36].
Now let X1, X
′
1 ∈ Rn be two vectors where the ith entry of each vector is an inde-
pendent sample from the distribution Di1. Similarly, let X2, X ′2 ∈ Rn be two vectors
where the ith entry of each vector is an independent sample from the distribution Di2.
The ideal values for X1, X
′
1 and X2, X
′
2 will be Xˆ1 and Xˆ2 respectively, both of which
are independent samples from the distribution H. Now let I be some extraction
algorithm which takes in values from X ∈ Rn and produces output over some set S.
For X to be useful in uniquely identifying physical objects we require it to satisfy the
following definition.
Definition 2.2.1. (Identifying Physical Variable (IPV)) Let µ : N → R+. A
PV X ∈ Rn for ψ(D) is said to be an identifying physical variable if there exists an
algorithm I with running-time polynomial in n such that for any two objects S1, S2 ∈H
ψ(D), I can achieve
Pr[∆(I(X1), I(X ′1)) < ∆(I(X1), I(X2))] ≥ 1− µ(n) ,
where µ(n) is a negligible function and ∆(a, b) is some semi-pseudo distance over
S. The probability is taken over any pair of objects in ψ(D) sampled independently
according to H.
We state this definition for Identifying PVs in order to express and quantify the
notion of the ability to uniquely identity physical objects. The definition above cap-
tures the notion that under our idealized assumptions the measured PV values from
some object S1 will with a very high probability be closer to each other than the
measured PV values from a different object S2.
2.3 Discretization and Identification
In this section we will restrict our attention to Gaussian distributions for Hi and for
Dij. We will also formalize our assumptions in order to explore when Gaussian PVs
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can be considered as IPVs. Recall that a Gaussian (N(M,Σ2)) random variable X
has a probability distribution function
e(X−M)
2/2Σ2
√
2piΣ2
,
where M is the mean and Σ2 is the variance.
In order for X to identify a large number of objects there needs to be a sufficient
amount of entropy in H. In general the entropy of a Gaussian distribution of variance
Σ2 will be log
(
Σ
√
2pie
)
which is the maximum entropy among all real-valued distri-
butions with a given mean and standard deviation [16].2 This quantity is limited,
and will require a large Σ in order to allow the identification of a large number of
objects. This is why we will need to consider PVs with n values larger than 1.
In some sense our goal will be to extract the entropy from X and use it to generate
the fingerprint. This task is made harder with the noise contaminating the ideal
values of the PV. Recall that X assumes values from the reals. It is typically easier
to reason about the identification ability of binary fingerprints. Due to this reason we
will start our extraction process by imposing a discretization technique on X. This
discretization process will have significant impact on both the noise level and the
identification ability of X. In this section we present two discretization techniques,
the halfspace technique and the threshold technique. In the coming two sections we
will elaborate on each of these techniques and then derive closed expression formulas
for their error and collision probability. Different discretization techniques can be
found in [96].
Before we start, we will list the assumptions that we have stated and which we
will use in the next two sections. We will use H to denote that multivariate Gaussian
made of all n independent Gaussian distributions Hi = N(Mi,Σ2). Where Mi is the
mean of the ith entry in X over all the physical objects in ψ(D). Note that by using
2Note that unless we mention otherwise, all logarithms in this dissertation are with respect to
base 2.
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Σ for all the entries of X we are assuming that the variability in all the entries of X
is equal. The measurement of the ith entity of X on some physical object Sj will be
a sample Xij from Dij = N(µij, σ2). We assume that Dij will be additive noise to
the ideal PV value Xˆij. Furthermore, to simplify our derivations we assume that the
noise has a mean value of 0, and therefore µij = Xˆij. In our derivations we use µij
to avoid confusion. Also, by fixing the variance in all the measurement distributions
to σ2 we are making the assumption that the measurement devices on any physical
object in ψ(D) will introduce the same level of noise. Following we formalize these
assumptions.
Assumption 2.3.1. Let X ∈ Rn be a PV for ψ(D). We assume,
1. For any physical object Sj ∈ ψ(D) the measurement of the ith entry of Xj is an
independent sample from the distribution Dij = N(µij, σ2).
2. For any given physical object Sj ∈H ψ(D) the mean of the measurement on the
ith entry of X which is µij will be an independent sample from the distribution
Hi = N(Mi,Σ2).
3. The distributions Hi = N(Mi,Σ2) are independent for i ∈ [1..n].
The above captures our idealized model of a PV.
2.3.1 Halfspace Technique
The idea here is to extract a single bit from each entry in X. This can be achieved by
simply breaking the space of Xij in half, such that over all possible values of Xij the
probability of extracting a 0 or 1 is equal. This approach was first proposed in [94]
and [73]. In order to extract a single bit we will use the mean of Xij overall physical
objects in ψ(D). The following equation captures the technique.
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Zij = HT(Xij) =
 1, Xij > Mi0, Xij ≤Mi
 . (2.1)
It should be clear that since Hi is symmetric aroundMi the above will yield a 0 or
a 1 with equal probability. Which means that Zij for two different objects will collide
with probability 0.5, we label this probability as Pc. This guarantees the extraction
of a single bit of entropy. With Assumption 2.3.1, the n entries of X will result in
n bits of entropy. Therefore, if we consider Zj = [Z1j, . . . , Znj] ∈ {0, 1}n to be the
fingerprint for each object, two physical objects S1, S2 ∈H ψ(D) will have an expected
Hamming distance of n
2
between Z1 and Z2. However, with the existence of noise the
Hamming distance between Z1 and Z2 will be affected. The next proposition will
address the issue of noise. In specific, the proposition quantifies the probability of
Zij yielding different values after two different reads. We use Zij and Z
′
ij to denote
two different extracted bits from the ith entry of a PV on the same physical object.
This proposition was proven in [57]. We restate the following proposition using our
notation.
Proposition 2.3.2. ([57]) let X ∈ Rn be a PV under Assumption 2.3.1, and Sj ∈H
ψ(D) be a physical object. Also, let Zij and Z
′
ij be the result of applying the halfspace
technique of Equation 2.1 to the output of two independent measurements of Xij. The
error probability
Pe = Pr[Zij 6= Z ′ij] =
1
2
− 1
pi
arctan
 Σ
σ
√
2 + σ
2
Σ2
 . (2.2)
It will be useful to rewrite the equation above using the ratio R = σ
Σ
as
Pe =
1
2
− 1
pi
arctan
(
1
R
√
2 +R2
)
.
Now we know the collision and error probability. Recall from Definition 2.2.1 that
we need a semi-pseudo distance such that except with a negligible probability the
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distance between Z1 and Z
′
1 is smaller than the distance between Z1 and Z2. As the
generated fingerprints are binary it will be natural to use the Hamming distance as
our metric. For two binary vectors a, b ∈ {0, 1}n we use d(a, b) = |a ⊕ b| to denote
the Hamming distance, where |a| is the Hamming weight3 of a. Now we can prove
the following theorem.
Theorem 2.3.3. let X ∈ Rn be a PV under Assumption 2.3.1, and S1, S2 ∈H ψ(D).
If n = Ω(R5) then d(Z1, Z
′
1) < d(Z1, Z2) except with a negligible probability in n.
Therefore, X is an IPV.
Proof. Let d1 = d(Z1, Z
′
1) and d12 = d(Z1, Z2). For each bit in the Zj the probability
of Zi1 and Zi2 not being equal is Pnc = 1 − Pc = 12 , while the probability of an
error (different bit) between Zi1 and Z
′
i1 is Pe =
1
2
− 1
pi
arctan
(
1
R
√
2+R2
)
. We need to
find a specific Hamming distance which separates d1 and d12 except with a negligible
probability. We set this Hamming distance at n · ε where ε = 1
2
(Pnc−Pe). Now using
Hoeffding Inequality [44] we have
Pr [|d1 − nPe| ≥ nε] < 2e−2ε2n
Similarly,
Pr [|d12 − nPnc| ≥ nε] < 2e−2ε2n
We know that Pe ≤ Pnc, so with probability at least 1− 4e−2ε2n we have
d12 > nPnc − nε and
nε+ nPe > d1 .
Therefore, d12 > d1. We now need to prove that with our choice of R the failure
probability Pf = 4e
−2ε2n is negligible. We have,
ε =
1
2
(Pnc − Pe) = 1
2pi
arctan
(
1
R
√
2 +R2
)
3The Hamming weight of a binary vector is the number of ones in the vector.
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One can easily show that arctan(x) ≥ x
x+1
. Therefore,
1
2pi
(
1
1 +R
√
2 +R2
)
≤ ε .
With our choice of n we get,
ε = Ω
(
1
n2/5
)
and finally,
Pf = 4e
−2ε2n = 4e−Ω(n
1/5) ,
which is negligible in n. This satisfies the conditions for an IPV (Definition 2.2.1).
The theorem above proves that even with a significant noise σ compared to the
variation in the PV Σ it is possible to use X as an IPV. Of course, using asymptotes
we are implicitly assuming that n can be made arbitrarily large. Also, we assume a
dependence between R and n. To get exact numbers for the failure probability and
the Hamming distances one can directly plug numbers into the equations above. We
next shift our attention to a different technique.
2.3.2 Threshold Technique
The halfspace technique was quite simple and straight forward to apply. It also
enabled us to easily quantify the extracted entropy. However, the problem with the
halfspace technique is that there might be more than a single bit of entropy in each of
the entries in X. Restricting our attention to a single bit might be wasteful in certain
cases. Another problem with the halfspace technique is that it requires knowing the
mean Mi for every entry of X. This might not be possible for all applications. These
two problems motivate the threshold technique.
In the threshold technique the extracted binary string is simply the binary rep-
resentation of Xij. The essence of this technique is really in the distance function
defined. It should be clear that using a Hamming distance will not be natural to the
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readings which come from the reals. Two values Xij and X
′
ij which are close to each
other (using the L1-distance), will not necessarily be close when using the Hamming
distance over their binary representation. Our focus in this section will be on the
distance function which will enable us to use the binary representation of Xij as our
fingerprint. Also, keep in mind that our goal is to place conditions on σ and Σ such
that X can become an IPV.
For two real values ai and bi we define the threshold distance which is a semi-
pseudo distance as follows. For any positive τ ,
dτ (ai, bi) =
 0, |ai − bi| ≤ τ1, |ai − bi| > τ
 . (2.3)
For two real vectors a = [a1, . . . , an] ∈ Rn and b = [b1, . . . , bn] ∈ Rn the distance is
defined as
dτ (a, b) =
n∑
i=1
dτ (ai, bi)
We now start by quantifying the probability of an error occurring (threshold dis-
tance 1) when measuring the ith entry of X on the same physical object. Before we
start, we recall the definition of the error function which is
erf(x) =
2√
pi
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt .
Proposition 2.3.4. let X ∈ Rn be a PV under Assumption 2.3.1, and Sj ∈H ψ(D)
be a physical object. The probability of having a threshold distance of 1 between Xij
and X ′ij is
Pe = Pr[d
τ (Xij, X
′
ij) = 1] = 1− erf
( τ
2σ
)
. (2.4)
Proof. The reading Xij will be drawn from Dij = N(µij, σ). We quantify the proba-
bility that two independent samples from Dij are a distance τ apart. We will quantify
the probability that no error occur which will be easier to carryout. We use dummy
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variables x and z in the derivation. Without loss of generality, since both Xij and
X ′ij come from the same distribution we shift the mean to 0. Pr[|Xij −X ′ij| ≤ τ ] =
=
∫ ∞
−∞
e−z
2/2σ2
√
2piσ2
dz
∫ z+τ
z−τ
e−x
2/2σ2
2
√
2piσ2
dx
=
1
2
√
2piσ2
∫ ∞
−∞
[
erf
(
z + τ√
2σ2
)
− erf
(
z − τ√
2σ2
)]
e−z
2/2σ2dz
=
1
2
√
2piσ2
[∫ ∞
−∞
e−z
2/2σ2erf
(
z + τ√
2σ2
)
dz −
∫ ∞
−∞
e−z
2/2σ2erf
(
z − τ√
2σ2
)
dz
]
=
1
2
[
erf
( τ
2σ
)
− erf
(−τ
2σ
)]
= erf
( τ
2σ
)
where the third line was done using∫ ∞
−∞
e−(αz+β)
2
erf (γz + δ) dz =
√
pi
α
erf
(
αδ − βγ√
α2 + γ2
)
. (2.5)
Now we have,
Pe = Pr[d
τ (Xij, X
′
ij) = 1] = 1− Pr[|Xij −X ′ij| ≤ τ ] = 1− erf
( τ
2σ
)
Next, we need to quantify the probability of a collision (threshold distance 0)
occurring when measuring the ith entry of X on two physical objects.
Proposition 2.3.5. let X ∈ Rn be a PV under Assumption 2.3.1, and S1, S2 ∈H
ψ(D). The probability of having a threshold distance of 0 between Xi1 and Xi2 is
Pc = Pr[d
τ (Xi1, Xi2) = 0] = erf
(
τ
2
√
σ2 + Σ2
)
. (2.6)
Proof. The measurement of Xij will be drawn from Dij = N(µij, σ). However, the
mean µij will be drawn from Hi = N(Mi,Σ2). For a collision to happen we need
|Xi1−Xi2| ≤ τ . To compute this probability we integrate over all values of the mean
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of the first object taken from Hi then we integrate over all possible values of Xi1
taken from Di1. This will cover every possible reading coming from the Xi1. We will
still have to integrate over all the mean values of the second object taken from Hi
and finally we integrate over all the values of Xi2 coming from Di2 and which are at a
distance τ from Xi1. Similar to the previous proof we will without loss of generality
shift the mean of Hi to 0 as both Xi1 and Xi2 come from the same distribution. We
use dummy variables z, x, t and l in the derivation. Now we have Pr[|Xi1−Xi2| ≤ τ ] =
=
∫ ∞
−∞
e−z
2/2Σ2
√
2piΣ2
dz
∫ ∞
−∞
e−(x−z)
2/2σ2
√
2piσ2
dx
∫ ∞
−∞
e−t
2/2Σ2
√
2piΣ2
dt
∫ x+τ
x−τ
e−(l−t)
2/2σ2
√
2piσ2
dl
=
∫ ∞
−∞
e−z
2/2Σ2
2
√
2piΣ2
dz
∫ ∞
−∞
e−(x−z)
2/2σ2
√
2piσ2
dx ·∫ ∞
−∞
e−t
2/2Σ2
√
2piΣ2
[
erf
(−x+ τ + t√
2σ2
)
− erf
(−x− τ + t√
2σ2
)]
dt
=
∫ ∞
−∞
e−z
2/2Σ2
2
√
2piΣ2
dz
∫ ∞
−∞
e−(x−z)
2/2σ2
√
2piσ2
[
erf
(
−x+ τ√
2(σ2 + Σ2)
)
− erf
(
−x− τ√
2(σ2 + Σ2)
)]
dx
=
∫ ∞
−∞
e−z
2/2Σ2
2
√
2piΣ2
dz
[
erf
(
z + τ√
2(2σ2 + Σ2)
)
− erf
(
z − τ√
2(2σ2 + Σ2)
)]
dx
=
1
2
[
erf
(
τ√
2(2σ2 + 2Σ2)
)
− erf
(
−τ√
2(2σ2 + 2Σ2)
)]
dx
= erf
(
τ
2
√
σ2 + Σ2
)
where all the integrations were carried out using Equation 2.5.
With the last two proposition we can now bound the value of n which allows X
to be used as an IPV under the threshold distance. As before we use n entries for
the PV X.
Theorem 2.3.6. let X ∈ Rn be a PV under Assumption 2.3.1, and S1, S2 ∈H ψ(D).
If n = Ω(R5) and T = τ
2σ
= O(1), then dτ (X1, X ′1) < dτ (X1, X2) except with a
negligible probability in n. Therefore, X is an IPV.
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Proof. The theorem proceeds similar to Theorem 2.3.3. We define Pnc = 1−Pc. Note
that for the halfspace technique we had Pnc = Pc. Now set, R =
σ
Σ
as before and
T = τ
2σ
.
Pc = erf
(
τ
2
√
σ2 + Σ2
)
= erf
(
τ
2σ
R
√
1 +R2
)
= erf
(
T
R√
1 +R2
)
Let C = R√
1+R2
≤ 1. Next we set ε = 1
2
(Pnc−Pe). We can now show that that ε ≥ 0.
ε =
1
2
(erf(T )− erf(TC)) ,
since the error function erf() is increasing for T ≥ 0 and C ≤ 1 therefore ε ≥ 0
and Pnc ≥ Pe. We can now use the same steps as Theorem 2.3.3 to deduce that
dτ (X1, X
′
1) < d
τ (X1, X2) except with probability Pf = 4e
−2ε2n. All we need to do
now is to show that with our choice of R the failure probability Pf is negligible. We
have,
ε =
1
2
(erf(T )− erf(TC)) = 1√
pi
∫ T
TC
e−u
2
du ≥ e
−T 2
√
pi
(T − TC)
We also have,
1− C = 1− R√
1 +R2
= Ω
(
1
R2+
)
,
for any  > 0.
ε = Ω
(
1
R2+
)
= Ω
(
1
n(2+)/5
)
.
Substituting into Pf we get,
Pf = 4e
Ω(n(1−2)/5) .
By choosing  < 0.1, where 0.1 was chosen as an arbitrary small value, the above
becomes negligible in n. Therefore, X is an IPV.
The significance of the theorem above is that even with an R which is quite
significant there will always be a way to use X as an IPV using the threshold distance.
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In terms of handling different R values there is barely any difference between the
halfspace and the threshold techniques. This should be expected since we are using
asymptotes. What is interesting about the threshold technique is that it does not
require prior knowledge of the mean Mi. The above shows that when using the
binary representation of Xij as the fingerprint it is possible to use X as an IPV.
2.4 Fuzzy Extractors
In this section we review fuzzy extractors and quickly discuss their relation to the
previous discretization techniques. In the next chapter we will utilize fuzzy extractors
in a specific application. Loosely speaking a fuzzy extractor is a technique to extract
randomness from a given string such that it is possible to reproduce the same output
string from a noisy version of the input string. In [20] the authors show how a
fuzzy extractor can be built using an error correcting code along with a universal
hashing function. Their construction requires that the output of the fingerprint (the
biometric data in their language) be represented as an element of Fn for some field F
and an integer n which represents the size of the fingerprint. Moreover, it is naturally
assumed that the noise experienced by the fingerprint is upper bounded by a constant
distance from the original fingerprint in order to guarantee identical reproduction of
the extracted key.
In some sense fuzzy extractors assume the existence of IPVs in order to provide
some guarantee on the distance. It is also natural to think of fuzzy extractors as
the natural next step after discretization. To a great extent our review here will
follow [20]. We start by quoting the following definition from [20]. We will use the
following terms. The definition of min entropy is H∞(A) = − log(maxaPr[A = a]).
The conditional min-entropy is H∞(X|I) (meaning X conditioned on I)4. Also, recall
4Typically we use the | operator to mean concatenation. This will be the only part of this
dissertation where it will have a different meaning.
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the definition of the statistical distance between two probability distributions A and
B, SD(A,B)= 1
2
∑
v |Pr(A = v) − Pr(B = v)|. U` is the uniform distribution over
{0, 1}`. Finally, dis(a, b) is the distance between a and b using some distance function.
Definition 2.4.1. ([20]) A (S,m, `, t, )-average-case fuzzy extractor is a pair of
randomized procedures, generate (Gen) and reproduce (Rep), with the following prop-
erties:
1. The generation procedure Gen on input x ∈ S outputs an extracted string Z ∈
{0, 1}` and a helper string P ∈ {0, 1}∗.
2. The reproduction procedure Rep takes an element x ∈ S and a bit string P ∈
{0, 1}∗ as inputs. The correctness property of fuzzy extractors guarantees that if
dis(x, x′) ≤ t and R,P were generated by (R,P )← Gen(x), then Rep(x′, P ) =
R. If dis(x, x′) > t, then no guarantee is provided about the output of Rep.
3. The security property guarantees that for any distribution X on S of min-
entropy m, the string R is nearly uniform even for those who observe P : if
(R,P ) ← Gen(X), then SD((R,P ), (U`, P )) ≤ . Furthermore, if H∞(X|I) ≥
m, then SD((R,P, I), (U `, P, I)) ≤  for any auxiliary random variable I.
A fuzzy extractor is efficient if Gen and Rep run in expected polynomial time.
In this chapter we will be interested in a specific class of fuzzy extractors, namely
the code offset fuzzy extractors. The next theorem stated and proven in [20] outlines
this class.
Theorem 2.4.1. ([20]) Given any [n, k, 2t + 1]F code C and any m, , there exists
an average-case (M,m, `, t, )-fuzzy extractor, where ` = m+ kf − nf − 2 log(1

) + 2.
The generation algorithm GEN and the recovery algorithm REP are efficient if C has
efficient encoding and decoding.
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We explain the parameters in the theorem by outlining a specific construction.
This construction was proposed in [20] and further detailed in [38]. As stated in
the theorem, C is an error correcting code over the field F , where f = log(|F|).
For the construction we will also need a family of universal hashing functions5 H .
The generation algorithm GEN takes the fingerprint x ∈ Fn as input and outputs
the triplet (k, w, v). Here, x is drawn from some distribution X over Fn which has
min-entropy m. GEN starts by computing w = x + c for a randomly chosen code
word c ∈ C and then computes the key k = hv(x) ∈ {0, 1}` for some string v chosen
uniformly at random such that hv ∈ H. The recovery algorithm REP takes in the
helper data (w, v) along with x′ a noisy version of the fingerprint x and returns the key
k. REP starts by computing c′ = w−x′ which is a noisy version of c. If the Hamming
distance between x and x′ is less than t then so will be the Hamming distance between
c and c′ and therefore using the error correcting code REP can reproduce c from c′.
Next, REP can compute x = w − c and consequently compute k = hv(x) which will
conclude the recovery algorithm.
With this construction we will have a clear way to build a fuzzy extractor. How-
ever, the key size ` and the security parameter  will both depend on m and the
code used. Moreover, the code will depend on the noise rate in the fingerprint. We
finish this section by relating the min-entropy and the error rate of the fingerprint.
Recall, that x is required to have a min-entropy of m and at the same time using the
construction above, x will have n symbols from F . To merge these two requirements
we define the average min-entropy in every symbol δ = m/n. We also define ν to be
the noise rate in the fingerprint x and F = |F|. With these definitions we can now
prove the following simple bound relating the noise rate and the min-entropy rate
δ/f . We will first need the definition of F -ary entropy function.
HF (p) = p logF
(
F − 1
p
)
+ (1− p) logF
(
1
1− p
)
.
5For details on universal hashing the reader is referred to [14].
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Proposition 2.4.2. For the fuzzy extractor construction of Theorem 2.4.1, and for
any meaningful security parameters of  < 1 and ` > 2 we have HF (ν) <
δ
f
.
Proof. From Theorem 2.4.1 we now that ` = m + kf − nf − 2 log(1

) + 2. Let
A = `+ 2 log(1

)− 2 = m+ kf − nf . From the conditions above we now that A > 0
and therefore m + kf − nf > 0. Let R = k/n which yields (δ + Rf − f)n > 0 and
therefore R > 1− δ/f . Using the sphere packing bound where k/n = R ≤ 1−HF (ν)
we immediately get HF (ν) <
δ
f
.
As it is impossible to calculate the min-entropy for a physical source we will
estimate this quantity over the symbols of x. The bound given above will give us
an idea whether the min-entropy in the symbols of x will be sufficient to handle the
measured noise rate. This will be useful in the next chapter when we deal with a real
physical source.
We finish this section be relating the review above to the extraction techniques
discussed in the previous section. For the halfspace technique the output will be a
binary string. Using Assumption 2.3.1 we showed that for any two physical objects
S1, S2 ∈H ψ(D) we have d(Z1, Z ′1) < d(Z1, Z2) except with a negligible probability.
We also know that the entropy in the output of the halfspace technique will be n. By
using any reading from a physical object to form the template w produced by Gen and
by setting the distance separating d(Z1, Z
′
1) from d(Z1, Z2) to t, the fuzzy extractor
in the above construction will work properly except with a negligible probability.
To show how the threshold technique can be properly used with a fuzzy extractor
is slightly more complicated. For clarity we will postpone this discussion to Section
3.4.1 where we will be working with a real application.
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2.5 Summary
In this chapter we studied Gaussian PVs and discussed discretization techniques
which can enable using PVs as IPVs. We thoroughly derived the error and collision
probability for the new threshold technique. We also provided a review of fuzzy
extractors which will become quite useful in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
CD Fingerprinting
In this chapter we introduce a new technique for extracting unique fingerprints from
identical CDs. The proposed technique takes advantage of manufacturing variability
found in the length of the CD lands and pits which will be the PV used in this
chapter. Although the variability measured is on the order of 20 nm the technique
does not require the use of microscopes or any advanced equipment. Instead, the
electrical signal produced by the photo detector inside the CD reader will be sufficient
to measure the desired variability. We thoroughly investigate the new technique by
analyzing data collected from 100 identical CDs and show how to extract a unique
fingerprint for each CD. We also give specific parameters and code constructions to
convert the derived fingerprints into 128-bit cryptographic keys. Finally, we outline
a simple protocol which utilizes the CD fingerprint to provide IP protection for the
software stored on the CD without taking away from the users ownership.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we
present some background information. In Section 3.2, we discuss the physical aspects
of CD storage, the sources of manufacturing variability and the theoretical model
capturing the CD variability. Section 3.3 presents experimental data to verify our
theoretical model. In Section 3.4 we discuss the fingerprint extraction technique and
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determine the parameters necessary for key generation. We discuss the robustness of
the fingerprint in Section 3.5 and we propose a simple protocol for usage in Section
3.6.
3.1 Background
According to a study by the Business Software Alliance about 35% of the global soft-
ware market, worth $141 Billion, is counterfeit. Most of the counterfeit software is
distributed in the form of a compact disc CD or a digital video disc DVD which is
easily copied and sold in street corners all around the world but mostly in develop-
ing countries. Given the severity of the problem in hand, a comprehensive solution
taking into account the manufacturing process, economical implications, ease of en-
forcement, and the owner’s rights, needs to be developed. While this is an enourmous
undertaking requiring new schemes at all levels of implementation, in this work, we
focus on secure fingerprinting techniques for optical media.1
To address this problem the SecuRom technology was introduced by Sony DADC.
SecuROM uses the location information of hidden markers (faulty bits) to uniquely
identify a key. The technology links the identifiers produced to executable files which
may only be accessed when the CD is placed in the reader. The main advantage of
this technology is that it can be used with existing CD readers and writers. While
the specifics of the scheme are not disclosed, in practice, the technology seems to be
too fragile, i.e. slightly overused CDs become unidentifiable. Another problem is at
the protocol level. The digital rights management (DRM) is enforced too harshly,
therefore significantly curtailing the rights of the CD owner.
In this chapter we take advantage of CD manufacturing variability in order to
generate unique CD fingerprints. As discussed in the previous chapter the approach
1We shall refer to all optical discs including compact discs, digital video discs (DVDs), and
Sony c©Blue-Ray discs as CDs for the remainder of this chapter.
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of using manufacturing variability to fingerprint a device or to build cryptographic
primitives has been applied in several contexts.
3.2 Pits and Lands
In this section we briefly describe how data is stored on a CD. We also present our
model to describe the dimensions of the CD features. On a typical CD data is stored
as a series of lands and pits formed on the surface of the CD. The pits are bumps
separated by the lands to form a spiral track on the surface of the CD. The spiral
track starts from the center of the CD and spirals outward. It has a width of about
0.5 µm and a 1.6 µm separation. The length of the land or pit determines the stored
data. The encoding length can assume only one of nine lengths with minimum value
in the range 833 to 972 nm up to a maximum of 3054 to 3563 nm with increments
ranging from 278 to 324 nm. Note that the range is dependent on the speed used
while writing the CD. To read the data on the CD the reader shines a laser on the
surface of the CD and collects the reflected beam. When the laser hits the pits it will
reflect in a diffused fashion thus appearing relatively dark compared to the the lands.
Upon the collection of the incoming beam, the reader can deduce the location and
length of the lands and pits which results in reading the data on the CD.
CDs are written in two ways, pressing and burning. In pressed CDs a master tem-
plate is formed with lands and pits corresponding to the data. The master template
is then pressed into blank CDs in order to form a large number of copies. In burned
CDs, the writing laser heats the dye layer on the CD-R to a point where it turns
dark, thus reflecting the reading laser in a manner consistent with physical lands.
Note that the burned CDs will not have physical lands and pits but will act as if
they had these features. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the lands and pits of a pressed CD.
We captured Figure 3.1 using an optical microscope and Figure 3.2 using a scanning
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electron microscope.
Figure 3.1: Lands and pits (Optical Microscope)
3.2.1 Source of Variation
Similar to any physical process, during the writing process CDs will undergo man-
ufacturing variation which will directly affect the length of the lands and pits. For
burned CDs this variability will be a direct result of the velocity of the CD while
writing takes place. This velocity is assumed to be at a fixed rate between 1.2 and
1.4 m/s where the velocity variation during writing should be within ±0.01m/s [22].
Pressed CDs are manufactured by molding thermoplastics from a micro or nanos-
tructured master prepared by lithographic methods. The molding process itself is
optimized for replication fidelity and speed, and typical replication variations are on
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the order of tens of nanometers [88]. The molding process involves contacting the
thermoplastic with the master slightly above the glass transition temperature of the
material, with a preset pressure for a brief amount of time, cooling the master and
the thermoplastic to below the glass transition temperature and demoulding. Local
variations of polymer material’s mechanical and thermal properties, local variations
of the temperature and pressure all potentially lead to variations in the imprinted
structures. The thermal stresses induced during cooling and demoulding also poten-
tially lead to variations. In this chapter we aim at using the small variation in the
length of lands and pits in order to form a unique fingerprint for each CD. In the next
section we characterize the length features of lands and pits.
Figure 3.2: Lands and pits (SEM capture)
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3.2.2 Single Location Characterization
Together lands and pits form the full spiral track. Therefore, it makes sense to
fingerprint only lands or pits. The length of both lands and pits will follow similar
distributions which is why we will simply use the term location to refer to either of
them. We label the lengths of k consecutive locations by starting from a reference
point on the track, as L1, L2, . . . , Ln. In the ideal setting Li = ci · L for a small
constant integer ci ∈ [3, 4, . . . , 11] and L ≈ 300 nm. However, due to the subtle
variations we talked about in the previous section we expect Li = ci · L + `i. The
variable `i is expected to be quite small compared to Li, and therefore difficult to
measure precisely. Still our measurements should be centered around the ideal length.
Hence, quite naturally across all identical CDs we model Li as a random variable
drawn from a Gaussian distribution Hi = N(Mi,Σ2) whereMi = ci ·L and Σ denotes
the mean and the standard deviation respectively. The length L will be the PV of
this chapter. Note that in the language of the previous chapter, the length of each
location (out of n CD locations) can be treated as an entry in the PV.
Here we are assuming that regardless of the location the standard deviation Σ will
be the same. This is a quite a realistic assumption since Σ is essentially capturing
the manufacturing variability which should affect all locations similarly. The more
precise the manufacturing process is, the less of a standard deviation we would expect
Hi to have. A perfect manufacturing process would have Σ = 0 and would therefore
give all CDs the same exact length of a specific location across all identical CDs. On
the other hand, for better identification of CDs we would like Hi to have a relatively
large Σ.
In a typical CD reader, the reading laser is reflected from the CD surface back into
a photo diode which generates an electrical signal that depends on the intensity of
the reflected laser. Therefore, the electrical signal is expected to depict the shape of
the CD surface. If these electrical signals are used to measure the length of any given
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location, we expect these measurements to have a certain level of noise following
a Gaussian distribution. So for location i on CDj we denote this distribution by
Dij = N(µij, σ2). The noise in the length measurements is captured through the
standard deviation σ. Since this quantity mainly depends on the readers noise we
assume that its the same for all CDs and CD locations. Contrary to Σ, to identify
different CDs using the length information of CD locations we would like to see a
relatively small σ. The theoretical model we use here is similar to Assumption 2.3.1.
Therefore, we will be using some of the equations derived in the previous chapter.
3.3 Experimental Validation
To validate the theoretical model, we conducted an extensive experiment on a number
of CDs. We directly probed into the electrical signal coming out of the photo diode
constellation inside the CD reader. The intensity of this signal will reflect the CD
surface geometry, and therefore can be used to study the length of the CD locations.
To sample the waveform we used a 20 GHz oscilloscope. The data was read from the
same locations on the same CD. Each CD was read a number of times in order to
get an idea of the actual D distribution. Similarly, multiple identical CDs (about 100
CDs) were read from the same locations in order to generate theH distribution. Each
collected trace required about 100 MB of storage space. Moreover, synchronizing the
different traces to make sure that the data was captured from the same location of
the CD was quite a challenge. We had to assign a master trace which represented
the locations we were interested in studying and then ran the other traces through
multiple correlation stages with the master to finally extract synchronized signals from
the same locations on different CDs. Automating the process in order to accurately
capture this massive amount of data was a time consuming challenge. However, we
note that all this work would be almost trivially eliminated if we had access to the
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internal synchronization signals of the CD reader chip. The captured signals were
then further processed, using Matlab, in order to extract the location lengths and
obtain the distributions. After processing, we extracted the length of 500 locations
(lands) on the CDs. We used commercially pressed CDs for all the experiments
reported in this chapter2.
Figure 3.3 shows the histogram of lengths extracted from 550 reads for a randomly
chosen location on one CD. The mean length of the histogram is about µij = 958 nm.
This histogram captures the D distribution. The other locations observe similar dis-
tributions with different mean lengths which will depend on the encoded information.
When considering data coming from different locations and different CDs we obtain
a Gaussian distribution with σ = 20 nm (with an average standard deviation of 2
nm on σ). This will be a good estimate for the noise observed during probing of the
electrical signals. These results verify the assumption that the noise in the electrical
signal can be approximated as Gaussian noise. Note that with Gaussian noise simple
averaging can be used to substantially reduce the noise level.
As we are interested to see the behavior of the location lengths across different
CDs we next shift our attention to two CDs before we look at a larger batch of
CDs. Figure 3.4 captures a histogram for the length of the same location on two
identical CDs. What is important here is the distance between the two Gaussian
distributions. The larger this distance becomes the easier it is to identify CDs. Our
basic thesis for fingerprinting CDs is that the length of a single location will vary
across multiple identical CDs. As pointed out earlier, this behavior can be modeled
with the Gaussian distribution Hi. The histogram in Figure 3.4 captures this for two
CDs. To generalize these results we need a larger sample space to estimate the Hi
distribution. The major problem here is that each data point needs to come from
2We have verified a similar behavior for burned CDs. Not surprisingly, the data from the burned
CDs had a much larger variation and was easier to analyze.
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a different CD. Therefore, to obtain a histogram which clearly depicts a Gaussian
we would need to test on the order of 500 CDs. This was not possible as each CD
required substantial time, computing power and storage space in order to produce
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Figure 3.3: Histogram of reads coming from the same location on the same CD
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Figure 3.4: Histograms for reads coming from the same location on two CDs with
identical data
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final data points. However, we were able to carry out this experiment for about 100
CDs. Each CD was read about 16 times to reduce the noise. Finally, we extracted
the lengths of 500 locations for each of the CDs. Figure 3.5 depicts the histogram
over 100 CDs for a randomly chosen location out of the 500 extracted locations.
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Figure 3.5: Histograms of reads coming from the same location on 100 identical CDs
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Figure 3.6: Histograms of reads coming from the 500 locations on 100 identical CDs
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The histogram in Figure 3.5 has a mean of about 940 nm. As mentioned earlier, for
all locations Σ had a mean of 21 nm with a standard deviation of 1.8 nm. The previous
histogram looks similar to a Gaussian distribution generated from 100 data points.
However, it would be interesting to get a confirmation that with more data points
the above histogram would actually yield a Gaussian. To do so, we normalized the
lengths of each location by subtracting the average length for that particular location.
Since the distribution for each location had roughly the same Σ the normalization
process effectively made all these distributions identical with a mean of 0 and a
standard deviation of Σ. We then collected all these data points (on the order of
50,000 points) and plotted the corresponding histogram. This is shown in Figure
3.6. The histogram of Figure 3.6 strongly supports our thesis of normally distributed
location lengths across different CDs. One might observe a slight imbalance on the
positive side of the Gaussian. This behavior seems to be a result of some of the CDs
having a DC offset. Fortunately, this will not pose a problem for our fingerprinting
technique as we will be normalizing each batch of data to have a mean of zero, thus
removing any DC components.
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Figure 3.7: Histogram of location lengths using the electrical signal
We finish this section by showing the histogram in Figure 3.7. The main purpose
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Figure 3.8: Histogram of location lengths using microscope images
of this histogram is to confirm that what we are studying is in fact the length of data
locations written on the CD. We elaborated earlier that the data on a CD is stored
in discrete lengths ranging from about 900 nm to about 3300 nm taking 9 steps in
increments of about 300 nm. We build the histogram in Figure 3.7 using the data
collected from 500 locations over the 100 CDs without normalizing each location’s
length to zero. In Figure 3.8 we show the same histogram with data extracted from
scanning electron microscope images via image processing.
3.4 CD Fingerprinting
There are many challenges in deriving a robust and secure fingerprint. One important
issue is the reading noise. Similar to a human fingerprint, we saw in the previous
section that the readings used to extract the CD fingerprint are inherently noisy.
The extraction of a deterministic and secure fingerprint from noisy data has been
previously studied in the literature [49, 48, 20]. Most relevant to our work is the
fuzzy extractor technique [20] which we have discussed in the previous chapter. For
the remainder of this section we will discuss how fuzzy extractors can be used in the
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CD setting. Moreover, we will discuss the experimental results and present various
bounds needed to achieve high levels of security.
3.4.1 Fingerprint Extraction
In the previous section we described how the empirical data suggests that every
CD has unique location lengths. These location lengths as can be seen from Figure
3.7 will have different values depending on the encoded information. Moreover, we
discussed earlier that the raw data measured from the electrical signal will sometimes
have different DC offsets. Therefore, it is important to process the data before the
different locations can be combined together in order to produce the final fingerprint
x. The first step in processing the data coming from every location on every CD is
to remove the signal noise. To achieve this, the length of every location on a CD
is averaged over a number of readings. Since we are assuming Gaussian noise, the
noise level σ will scale to σ/
√
a where a is the number of readings used for averaging.
Next, we normalize the data using the ideal average of each location. As the ideal
location lengths are discretized it becomes easy to find the ideal length for every
location and subtract it from the measured lengths. This will guarantee that all
location lengths have similar distributions as we saw in Figure 3.6. Finally, to remove
the DC component we need a second normalization step. We subtract the mean
of the reading coming from different locations of the same CD. Figure 3.9 and 3.10
show the lengths of 500 locations for two identical CDs after being averaged and
normalized. Each figure contains two traces each originating from the same CD but
read at different times. The vertical axis represents the variation in nanometers from
the ideal length of that location. It should be easy to see that identical CDs will have
different fingerprints.
We still need to outline a technique to extract a final fingerprint. Even after the
previous averaging and normalization steps we will still have errors in the length read-
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Figure 3.9: Length variation, 500 locations, CD1
ings. Although we will be using a fuzzy extractor to correct the errors, the biggest
challenge towards achieving an efficient extraction technique will be the nature of this
error. The noise is Gaussian over the real values of the lengths. This means that even
when the data is discretized the error will manifest itself more as a shift error from
the ideal length rather than a bit flip error. Unfortunately, the hamming metric does
not naturally accommodate for this kind of errors. Moreover, if we assume that every
location length of the CD will be a symbol in the extracted fingerprint, then the error
rate would be very high as it is very difficult to get the same exact length for the CD
locations. A more natural distance metric in this situation would be the Lee metric
[67]. However, this might require substantial changes to the fuzzy extractor construc-
tion outlined earlier. To solve this problem we proposed the threshold technique in
the previous chapter. Here we will elaborate on how the threshold scheme can be
combined with the fuzzy extractor of Theorem 2.4.1. A formulation of the threshold
scheme is shown in Table 3.4.1.
The scheme works as follows. We label the normalized readings from n locations
on a CD (or any source of these variables) by z ∈ Rn, where z = zn . . . z1 and the
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Figure 3.10: Length variation, 500 locations, CD2
symbols of z are bounded such that −2u−1 ≤ zi ≤ 2u−1 − 1 for some integer u. It is
also possible to scale the data to fit into a certain region. However, this might lead to
a blow up in the error rate. Each zi is shifted to the range 0 ≤ zi ≤ 2u − 1 and then
rounded to integers and discretized using simple unsigned binary encoding. If there is
a need to use l of the bits in the fractional part then the readings are first multiplied
by 2l before rounding. Now zi ∈ {0, 1}u+l. As explained earlier new readings of zi
will result in a noisy version z′i which is a shift from the original zi. If zi is defined
to be a symbol then any slight noise in z′i will result in counting that symbol as an
error. This is where the threshold scheme comes to play. To allow some room for the
reading to move without being considered as an error we define the threshold τ = 2s
where s < u+ l − 1. Any reading z′i is considered to be an error only if |zi − z′i| > τ
(threshold distance of 1). This seems pretty useful and straightforward as we can now
treat errors natural to the Lee metric as errors in the hamming metric. However, it
is not clear how we can get the fuzzy extractor of Theorem 2.4.1 to correct the cases
when |zi − z′i| ≤ τ . To get this scheme to work we need to sacrifice some of the bits
in zi. Specifically we break zi into two parts. The template part z1,i ∈ {0, 1}u+l−s−1
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which contains the most significant (u + l − s − 1) bits of zi. And the noisy part
z2,i containing the remaining bits of zi where , so zi = z1,i|z2,i. The field used in
the error correcting code C is only defined over the template part of zi. Therefore,
F = {0, 1}u+l−s−1 and f = u+ l − s− 1. Using the fuzzy extractor explained in the
previous chapter for the fingerprint x = xn . . . x1 we will have xi = z1,i. However,
the noisy part of zi will also need to be kept in order to help correct for the noise.
To generate (k, w, v) the GEN algorithm now works as follows. It takes in xi|z2,i for
i ∈ [1, . . . , n] and then choses a random code word c = cn . . . c1 ∈ Fn and computes
w = wn . . . w1 where wi = (xi|z2,i)+ (c|τ). As before v is chosen uniformly at random
and k = hv(x) where h ∈ H is a universal hash function. The recovery algorithm
REP will now take in a noisy version of z which is z′. To recover x, REP computes
Ci = wi − zi = (xi|z2,i) + (c|τ) − (z′1,i|z′2,i). Now since xi = z1,i we can rewrite this
as Ci = (zi − z′i) + (ci|2s). If zi − z′i < −2s or if zi − z′i > 2s − 1 then there will be
no carry from the template part to the noisy part of wi, and therefore c
′
i = ci. In
any other case ci will change therefore resulting in an error in c
′
i. Upon retrieval of
c′ the error correcting code will be able to correct it back to c given that less than
t of the symbols were out of the threshold bound. Following is a formulation of the
above discussion.
The threshold τ solves the error correcting problem with respect to the Lee dis-
tance. In particular, τ helps control the error rate which arises when treating the real
values as symbols over some field. Without a threshold scheme (τ = 0), the error
rate will be very high. On the other hand if τ grows too large then the error rate
will be low. However, the collision rate between the CDs will start to increase thus
decreasing distinguishability between CDs. We have already computed the error rate
and the collision rate of the threshold technique in Equations 2.4 and 2.6. These
equations will hold for the CD case if Assumption 2.3.1 holds.
To verify the error probabilities given in Equations 2.4 and 2.6 we used the data
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Threshold Scheme: (GEN,REP) parameterized by M,m, `, t, , l, C, H, τ = 2s
GEN: (k, w, v)← GEN(CDj)
1. Obtain (a) samples for the length of each of the n locations on CDj.
2. Generate z = zn . . . z1:
a. Average the lengths over a samples,
b. Subtract the ideal mean from the averaged reads,
c. Normalize the sequence to have a zero mean and set that to z.
3. Find u such that −2u−1 ≤ zi ≤ 2u−1 − 1 for all i, then shift zi to 0 ≤ zi ≤ 2u − 1.
4. Take the binary representation of zi, shift left by l bits and round to an integer.
5. Form z2,i, the lowest s+ 1 bits of zi, and set xi = z1,i to be the remaining bits of zi.
6. Set x = xn . . . x1 to be the fingerprint template.
7. Choose a random code word c ∈ C, such that c = cn . . . c1.
8. Compute wi = (xi|z2,i) + (c|τ) and form w = wn . . . w1.
9. Randomly choose v to compute k = hv(x) where hv ∈ H, and output (k, w, v).
REP: k ← REP(CDj, w, v)
1. Generate z′ as in GEN.
2. Set c′i to be the the highest u+ l − s− 1 bits of wi − z′i.
3. Use C to correct c′ = c′n . . . c′1 to c = cn . . . c1.
4. Compute xi = wi − ci.
5. Form x = xn . . . x1 and return k = hv(x).
Table 3.1: Formulation of the threshold technique for CD fingerprint extraction
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collected from 100 CDs. In this data there was no averaging over the samples and
therefore σ was not changed. The data we have uses 500 locations on each CD. Under
the assumption that these errors will occur independently across the location then
the expected value of the number of errors should be 500Pe. Similarly, the number
of collisions observed assuming the independence of the extracted symbols should be
500Pc. Figure 3.11 plots the expected theoretical (circle) and the observed (square)
number of errors both as a function of s = log(τ). One can see that the theoretical
model does a good job predicting the behavior of the experimental data. Also, this is
a verification on the error independence assumption. Figure 3.12 shows the expected
theoretical (circle) and the observed (square) number of collisions between the ex-
tracted strings as a function of s. Naturally the theoretical model expects a slightly
lower number of collisions due to the independence assumption. As we will discuss
in the coming section there will always be a level of dependency between different
locations in the CD which will result in a higher collision rate.
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Figure 3.11: Number of errors
To have useful fingerprints, 1 − Pc has to to be significantly larger than Pe, oth-
erwise the CDs will start looking alike. Without averaging, σ results in a high error
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Figure 3.12: Number of collisions
rate which is larger than 1−Pc. Therefore it becomes important to average before ex-
traction. Also we saw in Proposition 2.4.2 that the entropy of the error rate imposed
a lower bound on the amount of entropy needed to have a realistic fuzzy extractor
scheme. This is another reason to push for a low error rate. In the next section we
discuss entropy and error rate estimations.
3.4.2 Entropy Estimation and 128-bit Security
The previous sections dealt with the theoretical aspects of extracting the CD fin-
gerprint. In this section we take more of an experimental approach where we are
more interested in computing actual parameters. The most important parameters
that we need to estimate are the entropy of the source (the CD variability) and the
noise level. The first and hardest task here will be to decide the amount of entropy
generated by the source. In [38] and [47] the authors use a universal source coding
algorithm in order to estimate the secrecy rate. In particular it was proposed to
use the Context-Tree Weighting Method (CTW) [100]. What is quite useful about
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the CTW algorithm is that in [99] it was shown that for any binary stationary and
ergodic source X, the compression rate achieved by CTW is upper bounded by the
min-entropy H∞(X) as the length of the input sequence approaches infinity. This is
a good indication about the entropy produced by the source provided enough bits are
fed to the algorithm. To apply this algorithm to our setting we start by using the
data coming from the 100 CDs. On each CD we collected data from 500 locations
and processed the data with a threshold value of τ = 22. The final data came out to
be in the range [0, 25− 1] and we did not use any fractional bits so l = 0. With these
parameters the size of the symbols was f = 2. This means that every CD produced
1000 bits. The data was fed into the CTW algorithm which resulted in a compression
rate of about 0.83 bits of entropy per extracted bit. Recall here that these samples
were not averaged over multiple reads. Therefore the error rate is quite high. When
we averaged over 16 samples the combined entropy became 0.71. This is expected
since the noise will add to the entropy. In order to get a more precise estimate for
the min entropy we decided to average over 225 reads. With this many reads we had
to restrict our samples to only 14 CDs as the amount of data quickly becomes large.
With the new sample the compression rate of the CTW algorithm was about 0.675
which seemed to be a good estimate of our min-entropy. For this sample the average
error rate is Pe = 8%. That is, on average about 40 of the 500 locations will fall out
of the threshold region. On the other hand the collision probability is about 46%.
We can use the result in Proposition 2.4.2 which suggests that for a noise rate
of 0.08 and f = 2 the entropy of the source should be at least 0.40 which translates
in δ = 0.8 < 1.35, and therefore we conclude that we have enough entropy in our
source. However, with this level of entropy we are placing stringent conditions on
R, i.e. the rate of the error correcting code.3 To relax the restriction on the code
3Recall from the prof of Proposition 2.4.2 that R ≥ A/nf + (1 − δ/f) for a security level of at
least A = `+ 2− 2.
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rate we took a closer look at our source bits. Ideally the two bits would have the
same entropy. However looking at Figure 3.9 and 3.10 and multiple similar figures
we clearly see that there is a degree of dependency between the adjacent locations.
There is a low probability of a sharp change of the length variability from one location
to its neighbor. With this observation we would suspect that the most significant bit
will have less entropy as it is less likely to change across adjacent locations. To verify
this we applied the CTW algorithm to each of the two extracted bits separately.
For the most significant bit the entropy for the above three cases of no averaging,
averaging over 16 reads, and averaging over 225 reads we found 1, 0.9, 0.6-bits of
entropy, respectively. When we repeated this process for the least significant bit we
obtained 1, 1, 0.98-bits of entropy, respectively. Clearly, we have more entropy in the
least significant bit. It seems reasonable to only use the least significant bit to form
the fingerprint and the final key. This would effectively increase the entropy of our
source while very slightly affecting the error rate and the collision rate. For this least
significant bit scheme we obtained Pe = 8% and Pc = 0.46%.
With the parameters we have, Pe = 0.08 and δ = 0.98 and f = 1 we can build
a fuzzy extractor which can extract secure keys from CD fingerprints. For a 128-bit
key we set ` = 128. Similarly, to achieve a fuzzy extractor output which reveals
very little information about the fingerprint we set  = 64. Using the equation of
Theorem 2.4.1 we require that the error correcting code in the fuzzy extractor should
satisfy k ≥ 190 + 0.02n. Note that although Pe = 0.08, this is the expected error
rate. For a practical scheme we require the fuzzy extractor to correct around a 0.17
error probability. These parameters can now be satisfied using a binary BCH code of
[255, 45, 88]. More specifically, we define a code word containing 7 code words of this
BCH code, which will make n = 1785. With this construction the failure probability4
Pfail will be on the order of 10
−6. Note here that treating the 7 code words separately
4Here, Pfail = 1−
(
1−∑t=43i=0 (ni)P ie(1− Pe)n−i)7.
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to generate separate parts of the key would significantly decrease  but will decrease
the failure probability. Therefore, in our failure probability we treat the 7 code words
as a single entity. As we noted earlier, our data suffers from higher error rates due to
the external connections which we used. With an on-chip process we can expect the
error rate to drop significantly.
3.5 Robustness of the Fingerprint
We mentioned earlier that a CD fingerprint can be used to tie software licenses to
individual CDs where the software is stored. Under this use scenario it becomes
important to address the robustness of the fingerprint. In all our experiments the
data collected came from locations in the same sector of the CD. In a real application
readings would typically be collected from different sectors. Thus ensuring that a
scratch or any physical damage to a specific location will not render the CD fingerprint
useless.
Another important concern regarding the robustness of the fingerprint is that
of aging. Although no quantitative estimate of fingerprint durability can be given
within the scope of this work, mechanisms related to viscoelastic relaxation in optical
disc patterns need to be discussed briefly. Optical discs are printed on polymeric sub-
strates, which have glass transition temperatures typically above 150 C. The viscosity
of such materials are temperature dependent and governed by an Arrhenius type ex-
ponential temperature dependence, described by an activation energy defined by the
glass transition temperature. In its simplest form, the Arrhenius model assumes that
the rate of change is proportional to e
−Ea
kT where Ea is the activation energy, k is the
Boltzmann constant (an invariant physical parameter), T is the absolute tempera-
ture (temperature in degrees Kelvin). Even at lower temperatures (natural operating
and storage temperature range of the optical disc), viscosity of the polymer remains
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finite. During the molding process, most of the internal stresses are relieved upon
cooling, therefore resulting in fluctuations in the nanoscale structure of the bit pat-
terns. The pressed discs have a thin metal coating, which is typically coated on to
the polymer disc by evaporation or sputter coating, that results in the increase of the
surface temperature by up to 50 C. This process is also likely to be a source of local
thermoelastic stress buildup which relaxes over the lifetime of the CD. In a first order
approximation, the disc material can be thought of as a Kelvin-Voigt material, and
creep relaxation can be approximated by a single time-constant exponential behavior.
In such a case, most of the viscoelastic relaxation will occur at the early stages of disc
production, and latter time scales will have less of an effect. It may be speculated
that the fingerprints due to length fluctuations of 25 nm upon 300nm characteristic
bit length will persist within at least 10% of the CD lifetime, which is predicted to be
217 years at 25C 40% Relative Humidity conditions. This gives an estimated 20 year
lifetime for the fingerprint [91]. Due to the exponential dependence of the relaxation
on time, by recording the signature on a slightly aged optical disc (months old), the
persistance of the signature can be increased.
3.6 License Distribution Protocol
To prevent unauthorized copies from installing, many popular software titles employ
a simple license checking scheme. In the simple license scheme the license key is
delivered in printed form (on the CD or its case). The oﬄine license distribution
scheme can be summarized as follows: identical copies of an installation software
are pressed on CDs. A unique license key is printed on the cover of each CD. The
CDs are sold to customers. Customers run the installation software on their machines.
During installation each customer enters the license key manually to the installer. The
installer checks the validity of the license. If valid, the installer copies the software
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to the target machine.
This scheme is convenient as no network connection is required to complete the
installation process. However, the oﬄine scheme has a number of flaws. The licenses
are checked for membership in a the set of valid licenses. This means that licenses
are not tied to CDs. In other words, the software on an authentic CD, can be
trivially copied for a fraction of a dollar to another CD, which will install under any
valid license key. One way to curb rampant CD counterfeiting is to require an online
license registration step, where a central database is contacted after verification of the
license which checks whether the number of valid installations are exceeded. If not,
the software is installed and the central database is updated accordingly. While this
simple online scheme is effective, it is inconvenient as it requires an online connection.
Furthermore, the restriction on the number of installations is highly restrictive and
unfair to paying owners of the CD. The main difficulty in binding a key to a CD is
that CDs are pressed with one template since the production of the template bears
significant cost. This means that CDs coming off a production line necessarily share
an identical digital image. Here we propose to use the physical fingerprints of the
CDs as an identifier. We bind this identifier to the license and thereby achieve unique
licenses that are intrinsically tied to CDs without changing the manufacturing process.
The proposed protocol works in a manner similar to the oﬄine distribution pro-
tocol. The license key here will be the helper data (w, v) along with the encrypted
version of the key EK(k), where EK() is an encryption function. The secret key K is
known to the installer and k is the unique key extracted from the CD. In this protocol
the CD reader is expected to provide the fingerprint x from publicly known addresses
on the CD. The user then feeds the installer with (w, v, EK(k)). The installer runs the
REP algorithm to retrieve k′ and then checks whether EK(k′) = EK(k) is satisfied.
This protocol is very simple and can clearly be bypassed if an attacker can force the
reader to return fingerprints of his choosing. While this attack is simple it requires
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modification to the reader of any user who wishes to use copied software. We finish
here by pointing out that more secure protocols are possible using the CD fingerprint.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter we showed how to generate unique fingerprints for any CD. The
proposed technique works for pressed and burned CDs, and in theory can be used for
other optical storage devices. We tested the proposed technique with a 100 identical
CDs and characterized the variability across the studied CDs. We also gave specific
parameters and showed how to extract a 128-bit cryptographic keys. This work opens
a new door of research in the area of CD IP-protection.
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Part II
Applications of Physically
Parameterized Functions
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Chapter 4
PUFs
In this part of the dissertation we will shift our attention to physically parameterized
functions (PPFs). PPFs are functions that use PVs as parameters. A special case
of PPFs are physically unclonable functions (PUFs) which are the natural successor
of POWFs. When PUFs were first introduced by Gassend et. al in [28] the authors
suggested that the name POWF was misleading and argued that the examples given
for POWFs did not really match the standard meaning of one-way functions, and
therefore they suggested that these physical functions should really be called physi-
cal random functions or PRFs. However, the acronym PRF is historically known to
stand for pseudo-random functions in cryptography. This lead the authors to use the
term PUF to stand for physically unclonable function.1 Unfortunately, due to the
popularity of the name, several physical functions which do not satisfy unclonability
have been labeled as PUFs. We argue that the term PPF is a more accurate descrip-
tion of most known PUF circuits. However, the problem we face in this part of the
dissertation is that most of our discussion is focused on a specific PPF which is known
as a delay-based PUF. This clearly causes confusion between the names used and the
actual functionality. On one hand, the term PUF is not accurate as a description. On
1Another reason mentioned in [28] is that the acronym PUF is easier to pronounce.
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the other hand, one needs to be consistent with the existing literature. As most of the
work presented in this part of the dissertation has been originally written before we
had a clear classification of PPFs, therefore we will keep the original notation which
happens to be consistent with the existing literature.
In this chapter we will throughly explore delay-based PUFs and their construc-
tions. The main job of this chapter will be to set the stage for PUFs before we can use
them in a number of cryptographic schemes with the goal of creating a more secure
PUF. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides a
review of major PUF proposals. We briefly explain the idea of each proposal and why
most of them do not qualify as unclonable functions. Section 4.2 describes delay-based
PUFs in details in addition to reviewing its mathematical model and properties. Fi-
nally, Section 4.3 presents a variant implementation of delay-based PUFs built with
tristate buffers.
4.1 Previous Work
Multiple designs have been proposed in the literature in an attempt to realize PUFs.
Coating PUFs were introduced in [95]. The main idea there is to use a randommixture
of particles with different dielectric properties in order to build a protective coating
layer around the chip. Beneath the surface, a number of sensors are installed in order
to measure the capacitance at different locations of the layer. Using the capacitance
reading, which will depend on the chemical structure of the layer, a secret key specific
to the hardware can be derived. The capacitance of the coating layer can be seen
as a PV. The capacitance sensors will act as measurements of the PV. One might
argue that it is difficult for an external attacker to replicate the coating layer, or
provide a mathematical model governing the input/output behavior. However, with
a limited number of sensors the behavior of the entire circuit can be captured in a
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small lookup table. This last observation highlights the fact that coating PUFs are
not really unclonable. Although the devices might be used to uniquely identify the
circuit, the fact that the entire behavior of the circuit can be replicated undermines
its ability to be an unclonable function. One great advantage of coating PUFs is
that any attempt to reverse engineer the circuit is faced with the coating layer. The
downside however, is that building the coating layer can be quite a costly task.
A different PUF proposal is the FPGA SRAM PUF which was introduced in
[38]. This device uses the startup values of the SRAM cells in an FPGA circuit.
Upon startup, the inverters inside an SRAM will have small voltage mismatches due
to manufacturing variability. This mismatch will be amplified upon startup, thus
resulting in a random startup value for the device. The PV here will be the small
voltage mismatch inside the SRAM inverters. The startup of the device will act as a
measurement producing the startup values of the SRAM cells. Similar to the coating
PUF the small (polynomial) size of the SRAM cells enables an attacker to build
a lookup table capable of simulating the SRAM PUF behavior. Therefore, SRAM
PUFs cannot be considered unclonable. In [65] the authors propose butterfly PUFs
which generalize the SRAM PUF idea to work on any FPGA even no intrinsic SRAM
unit is available. The butterfly PUF offers the same level of security as SRAM-PUFs.
Therefore, they also cannot be considered unclonable.
Delay-based PUFs also known as silicon PUFs were introduced and analyzed in
[28, 27, 29, 71]. This specific PUF will be the center of our discussion in this chapter.
Therefore, we postpone discussing the details of delay PUFs to the next section.
The usage of PUFs has typically been focused on the claim that they are un-
clonable. The relation between the challenges (input) and the responses (output) is
usually assumed to be a property of the hardware that cannot be cloned. This is not
always the case as we have seen. We will further elaborate on this point when we talk
about delay-based PUFs. Even if we assume that the input/output behavior is not
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clonable, this would mean that the user of the PUF needs to collect a large number
of input/output pairs to be able to authenticate the circuit which is impractical. On
some level there seems to be a contradiction here. On one hand, we would like for the
input/output relation of a PUF to be un-modelable, while on the other hand, we do
not want to store a massive input/output database. The solution as we will explore
in future chapters will be in resorting to computationally hard problems. The next
chapter will further elaborate on this point.
4.2 Delay-based PUFs
4.2.1 How PUFs Work
A delay-based PUF [27] is a {0, 1}n → {0, 1} mapping, that takes an n-bit challenge
(c) as an input and produces a single bit output (r). Figure 4.1 shows a multiplexer
delay-based PUF circuit consisting of n stages of switching gates. Each switch has
two input and two output bits in addition to a control bit. If the control bit of
the switch is 0, the two inputs are directly passed to the outputs through a straight
path. If on the other hand, the control bit to the switch is 1, the two input bits are
switched before being passed as output bits. Therefore, the control bit of each switch
will decide the path taken by the input signals. The n switches are serially connected
so that the output of each switch is connected to the input of the following switch.
The two outputs of the last switch are connected to a flip-flop, which is called the
arbiter. The two inputs to the first switch are connected to each other, and then
connected to a pulse generator.
From this point we will refer to delay-based PUFs as PUFs. We briefly describe
the operation of PUFs as follows. When a challenge c is received each of its n bits
is used as the control bit to one of the PUF switches. Next, a pulse is generated
and sent to the first switch. The pulse will break into two pulses entering the upper
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Figure 4.1: A multiplexer delay-based PUF circuit
and lower inputs of the first switch. Depending on the control bit of the first switch
the two signals will either travel in a straight path or they will switch locations.
Although the paths taken by the signals have been designed to have the same length,
due to manufacturing variability the two paths will have a small mismatch. This
mismatch will have a different value for each of the two possible paths of the two
signals. Therefore, the two pulses will acquire a time delay between them which is
dependent on the control bit of the first switch. The same argument applies for the
rest of the n switches. Each challenge c will impose a different path on the n switches.
Consequently, the total delay mismatch between the two signals will be a function of
c. The job of the arbiter at the end of the switch chain is to indicate which signal
arrives first. Recall that a flip-flop has two inputs, the data input and the clock input.
When the clock input observes a rising edge the data input is captured at the output
of the flip-flop. In a PUF setting, if the signal connected to the data input of the
arbiter arrives first, the output of the arbiter will be 1. Otherwise, the output will be
0.
The output of the circuit will depend on the delay mismatch in each of the stages.
The delay mismatch will be a small quantity which will be quite sensitive to external
effects. A major advantage of this sensitivity is to prevent physical attacks on the
system. Trying to tap into the circuit will cause a capacitance change therefore
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changing the output of the PUF circuit. Removing the outer layer of the chip will
have a permanent effect on these circuit variables and again, it will change the output
of the PUF circuit. Briefly, we can say that a well-built PUF device will be physically
tamper-resilient up to its sensitivity level.
4.2.2 Mathematical Model
In this section we derive a linear model for the delay-based PUF. In specific we
show that sufficient challenge-response pairs one can build a mathematical model
approximating the PUF behavior to a high degree. This will essentially undermine
the idea of PUFs being an unclonable function.
A similar but slightly different linear model was derived earlier in [27]. In their
model, n+ 1 variables are needed to describe the challenge-response relation. In the
model we derive, we show that this is only possible when certain assumptions are
made about the inter-switch versus the intra-switch delay variations. We start by
examining the behavior of the pulses passing through each of the n switches.
ai
C2 CnC1
Arbiter
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di
f i
Figure 4.2: A block diagram of a delay-based PUF circuit
At each of the n stages, each of the two pulses propagating through the PUF has
two paths to take. We label the two paths which the upper signal can take as ai
and bi, and for the lower signal as di and fi. This is illustrated in Figure 4.2 which
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captures a block diagram of the PUF. Paths ai and fi are chosen when the challenge
bit ci is 0, whereas bi and di are chosen when the challenge bit is 1. To compute the
total delay, the path of the upper signal is followed from the initial input pulse. The
signal will start traveling in a separate path to get to the first switch. Let us label
this initial incurred delay as a0. For the signal going through the lower path we label
this delay as f0. In the first switch, the signal will incur a delay that is dependent
on the control signal of the corresponding switch. The delay will be (c1a1 + c1b1),
where c1 is the complement of c1. The delay in the second switch will depend on
whether the signals switched paths in the first stage or not. If the signals changed
paths in the first switch, then the possible delays it will incur in the second switch
will be d2 or f2. Otherwise, the delay will be a2 or b2. The delay of the second
stage can be written as c1(c2a2 + c2b2) + c1(c2f2 + c2d2). To carry the analysis to
the rest of the switches, we introduce the variable xi = c1 ⊕ c2 ⊕ . . . ⊕ ci−1 where
x1 = 0. This variable xi represents the parity of the first i − 1 challenge bits, and
will signify if the signal starting at the upper path stays in that path or moves to the
lower path after i − 1 switches. The delay for the ith switch can now be denoted as
xi(ciai + cibi) + xi(cifi + cidi). The total delay in the pulse that starts in the upper
path will therefore be
D1 = a0 +
n∑
i=1
xi(ciai + cibi) + xi(cifi + cidi) .
Similarly, the delay for the pulse initiated in the lower path can be derived to be
equal to
D2 = f0 +
n∑
i=1
xi(cifi + cidi) + xi(ciai + cibi) .
The difference between these two delays δ is the main variable for our model. This
difference will decide whether the output of the PUF is 0 or 1. Since we do not know
which of the two signals will end up in the upper path, we will need to incorporate
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the parity of all the challenge bits which we label P . The difference between the two
delays becomes
δ = (−1)P (D1 −D2)
= (−1)P
(
n∑
i=1
(xi − xi)(ci(ai − fi) + ci(bi − di)) + (a0 − f0)
)
=
n∑
i=1
(−1)P⊕xi(ci(ai − fi) + ci(bi − di)) + (−1)P (a0 − f0) .
Finally, we define ui =
(ai−di)+(bi−fi)
2
and vi =
(ai+di)−(bi+fi)
2
for i = 1 . . . n, and
v0 = a0 − f0. We define the parity of the challenge bits from a reverse order as
pi = P ⊕ xi = ci ⊕ ci+1 ⊕ . . .⊕ cn. The delay equation becomes:
δ =
n∑
i=1
(−1)pi(ui + (−1)civi) + (−1)Pv0
=
n∑
i=1
(−1)piui + (−1)pi⊕civi + (−1)Pv0 .
In an actual implementation, there are only two paths connecting the consecutive
switches, the four possible paths mentioned take place inside the switches (see Figure
4.1). In reality, ai and di share the same path between the i
th switch and i + 1 st
switch. However, these two delays differ in their paths within the ith switch. The
same thing can be said about fi and bi. In the PUF circuit layout, the switches
will be positioned at a significant distance from each other. Therefore, the internal
delay variation in the ith switch ui will have a much smaller magnitude than the
delay variation vi in the path between the i
th switch and the i + 1 switch. Due to
this reason, we can drop the variable ui from the previous equation without having
a noticeable effect on the challenge-response relation.2 Note that p1 = P , and that
2This is the assumption needed to obtain a model similar to that in [27]. However, this assumption
can be eliminated if we use tristate buffers to build the delay-based PUF, this is explained in Section
4.3. The model derived there can essentially be described using Equation (4.1) with ci used instead
of pi.
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pi ⊕ ci = ci+1. We also define yi = vi−1. The final delay equation becomes
δ =
n∑
i=1
(−1)piyi + yn+1 . (4.1)
Equation 4.1 uses only n + 1 rather than 2n + 1 variables to describe the delay
between the upper and the lower signal paths. This reduction is very effective in
terms of efficiency, and at the same time slightly affects the error rate that can be
produced from such a model. It is important to note that the delay variations yi will
depend on the fabrication process of the PUF circuit. Therefore, one would expect
these variables to follow a normal distribution. In particular, the yi values will follow
a Gaussian distribution of mean zero, and a fixed variance [72, 71]. Without loss
of generality, we can normalize these values and assume they belong to a normal
distribution of mean 0 and variance 1. Note that the yi variables will be the entries
of the PV used in this section.
Now that we have a linear model capturing the behavior of the signals inside a
PUF circuit, we derive the input output relation. Invoking the arbiter conditions for
the response bit R we get,
δ − TS > 0→ R = 1
δ − TS ≤ 0→ R = 0 ,
where TS is the setup time for the flip flop utilized as an arbiter. To make this more
concise, we relate the delay value to the response bit as (−1)R(δ − TS) < 0. Finally,
we can use Equation 4.1 to write the response equation3
(−1)R(
n∑
i=1
(−1)piyi + yn+1) < 0 . (4.2)
Next, we show how to learn the yi values from the hardware implementation. For
this purpose, note that Equation 4.2 is an inequality relating the challenge C which
3For brevity the setup time TS can be merged with the last delay variable yn+1.
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consists of n input bits, ci, to the output bit R. This inequality has n + 1 variables
which characterize the PUF circuit. Passively observing the challenge-response pairs
(C(j), R(j)) for a single PUF, we may form the following linear equation
δj = (−1)p
(j)
1 y1 + (−1)p
(j)
2 y2 + . . .+ (−1)p
(j)
n yn + yn+1 .
Using Equation (4.2), we may write the following linear inequality:
(−1)R(j)
[
(−1)p(j)1 (−1)p(j)2 . . . (−1)p(j)n 1
]
Y < 0
where Y = [ y1, y2, · · · , yn , yn+1 ]T . With Ns challenge-response pairs we can
produce a system of linear inequalities and solve for Y using standard linear program-
ming methods [98, 86]. In order to test our mathematical model, we ran a number
of tests using MATLAB. Our tests were performed for three sizes of a PUF circuit
n = 32, 64 and 128. For each n we generated the n + 1 variables characterizing
the PUF using a Gaussian distribution, with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation
of 1. For each n we generated a number of random challenges Ns, and then cal-
culated the response of the PUF according to the model presented. We then used
the challenge-response pairs generated in order to solve for the n+ 1 variables which
were randomly chosen. In order to solve these equations we used the medium scale
algorithm supported by MATLAB [18], this algorithm is a variation of the known
Simplex algorithm [4]. In order to test the viability of the model we tested the noise-
less case. We generated 500,000 random points and compared the response produced
by our linear model. Table 4.1 shows the percentage error we obtained. It is im-
portant to note that the percentage error was calculated over the entire space of
possible challenges. However, if we constrain the challenges to the ones which were
used to build the linear model, then the linear model will perfectly match the actual
response. Hence, the linear model will essentially be a compressed version of the
challenge-response database. From the previous argument it might be tempting to
conclude that any level of accuracy can be achieved when attempting to model a PUF
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Number of challenge-response pairs Ns
n 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 8192 16384
32 40.33 33.03 21.18 11.63 5.70 2.61 1.37 0.61 0.28 0.14
64 45.77 40.62 32.44 21.27 11.30 5.64 2.60 1.11 0.57 0.27
128 47.66 45.30 40.08 32.02 21.38 12.13 5.94 2.89 1.27 0.59
Table 4.1: Percentage error for each (n,Ns) pair
circuit. However, this is not the case for an actual implementation. In [27, 68, 72],
results of modeling a PUF circuit implemented in FPGA and in ASIC are reported.
The lowest error rate achieved among these results was about 3%. Note that these re-
sults were achieved using machine learning algorithms. These results suggest a lower
limit on the achievable accuracy from modeling an actual PUF circuit. This lower
limit can be explained by the sensitivity of the circuit. For certain challenges the
circuit goes into a metastable state where the the two pulses enter a race condition.
In a metastable state the time difference between the two pulses will be smaller that
the resolution of the arbiter. Therefore, the PUF output will be 0 or 1 with almost
equal probability. These metastable states are not predictable, and will correspond
to different challenges at different times due to the changes in external interferences,
such as temperature, voltage and electromagnetic emanation. In [77], the authors
use metastability to help design a true random number generator. They predict that
about 0.1% of all the challenges will fall into a metastable state. Even in the presence
of noise it will be possible to solve for the Y values. In [8], the authors introduce a
polynomial time algorithm for solving noisy linear threshold functions similar to the
one implemented in a PUF. It can be said that the PUF circuit presented in this
section is completely modelable.
With the above we can now state the following definition of a PUF. The definition
models a delay-based PUF as a function with some error parameter which accounts
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for the noise and the modeling errors.
Definition 4.2.1. A PUF is a function characterized by the vector Y ∈ Rn+1 and the
noise parameter  ∈ (0, 1
2
)
, where Y = [y1, . . . , yn+1] and yi ∈ N(0, 1). N(µ, σ2) being
the normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ2. PUFY,(c) : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}
such that
PUFY,(c) = sign
(
n∑
i=1
(−1)piyi + yn+1
)
⊕ ν . (4.3)
where sign(x) = 1 if x > 0, and 0 if x ≤ 0. Also, ν = 1 with probability  and ν = 0
with probability 1− . Finally pi = ci ⊕ ci+1 ⊕ . . .⊕ cn, where ci is the ith bit of c.
Note that the relation between P = [p1 . . . pn] and C = [c1 . . . cn] can be described
using the equation (P = UC). The strings C and P are represented as column
vectors, U is the upper triangular matrix with all non-zero entries equal to 1 and the
matrix multiplication is performed modulo 2.
From the definition above it is clear that a PUF is a PPF. And from the earlier
discussion it is also clear that PUFs are clonable. When PUFs were proposed in
[27] the authors noted that PUFs may be vulnerable to modeling and differential
attacks in the original configuration. Therefore, in [28] the authors propose to apply
a cryptographic hash function to the output of the PUF circuit to eliminate such
attacks. However, recall from Chapter 1 that one of our goals is to achieve our goals
in a lightweight fashion. The introduction of the cryptographic hash function adds
significantly to the footprint and power consumption. A hash function is a challenging
cryptographic primitive to serialize. Therefore, reducing the gate count might not be
feasible. In [27], feed forward arbiters were proposed to introduce non-linearity into
the PUF scheme. This approach seems promising. However, since the feed forward
PUF are not known to be modelable, one would need to collect a large number of
challenge-response pairs for every PUF circuit and store them in a database. This is
the classical approach proposed in the early literature on PUF. This solution becomes
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less practical when the number of devices deployed becomes massive. We will attempt
to address this problem in the next two chapters.
In the next section we will explore some properties of PUFs based on the above
model.
4.2.3 Properties
In this section we will be concerned with one PUF property. The following lemma
characterizes the correlation between two PUF outputs obtained from different input
challenges. The proposition uses Definition 4.2.1 with the noise level  = 0.
Proposition 4.2.1. Given two n-bit strings a(1) and a(2) chosen independently and
uniformly at random from {0, 1}n, and Y0 = [y1, . . . , yn+1] where yi ∈ N(0, 1) for
i ∈ [1..n] and yn+1 = 0, and let z(1) = PUFY0(a(1)) and z(2) = PUFY0(a(2)). Assuming
that the yi values are independent then the probability that z
(1) and z(2) are equal is
Pr[z(1) = z(2)] = Fn(d) = 1− 2
pi
arctan
(√
d
n+ 1− d
)
. (4.4)
Where d is the Hamming distance between P (1) and P (2) and (P (i) = Ua(i)). The
strings a(i) are represented as column vectors, U is the upper triangular matrix with
all non-zero entries equal to 1 and the matrix multiplication is performed modulo 2.
Proof. First recall from the last section that for any string c = [c1, . . . cn] the PUF
response is
PUFY (c) = sign
(
n∑
i=1
(−1)piyi + yn+1
)
,
where pi = ci ⊕ . . . ⊕ cn and P = [p1, . . . , pn], as noted above (P = U · c). This
mapping is a linear bijection and will therefore preserve uniformity and independence.
Since a(1) and a(2) were chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}n, the same can be
said about the distribution of the corresponding P vectors P (1) = [p
(1)
1 , . . . p
(1)
n ] and
P (2) = [p
(2)
1 , . . . p
(2)
n ]. Let Z(P (j), Y0) =
∑n
i=1(−1)p
(j)
i yi + yn+1, and let d be the
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Hamming distance between P (1) and P (2). Without loss of generality we may assume
that the different bits of P (1) and P (2) are in the first d bit positions. Also, let
k = n+ 1. Now we can write
Z(P (1), Y0) =
d∑
i=1
(−1)p(1)i yi +
k∑
i=d+1
(−1)p(1)i yi = Dd + Sk−d
Z(P (2), Y0) = −Dd + Sk−d ,
where Dd =
∑d
i=1(−1)p
1
i yi and Sk−d =
∑k−1
i=d+1(−1)p
1
i yi + yk. Note that since z
(j) =
sign(Z(P (j), Y0)), then for z
(1) to be equal to z(2) we need Z(P (1), Y0) and Z(P
(2), Y0)
to have the same sign. For this, Dd needs to have a smaller magnitude than Sk−d
which means |Dd| < |Sk−d|. Therefore
Pr[z(1) = z(2)] = Pr[|Sk−d| − |Dd| > 0] = Pr[Rd > 0],
where Rd = |Sk−d|+ (−|Dd|). Let fR(Rd), fD(Dd) and fS(Sk−d) represent the proba-
bility distribution function (PDF) for each of the random variables Rd, Dd and Sk−d
respectively. Each term in the summations making up Dd and Sk−d involves one of
the bits p
(1)
i and the real value yi. Since yi ∈ N(0, 1) has mean zero and is symmetric
around the y-axis, we can easily see that multiplying with (−1)p(1)i will not affect the
normal distribution and therefore (−1)p(1)i yi ∈ N(0, 1). Now each of the variables Dd
and Sk−d is a summation of respectively d and k−d independent normal distributions
N(0, 1). Thus, fD(Dd) = N(0, d) and fS(Sk−d) = N(0, k − d).4 We are interested in
the PDF of −|Dd| and |Sk−d|. These can easily be calculated as follows:
f|S|(x) =
 2N(0, k − d) x > 00 x ≤ 0
 =
 2
e
−x2
2(k−d)√
2pi(k−d) x > 0
0 x ≤ 0
,
and
f−|D|(x) =
 0 x > 02N(0, d) x ≤ 0
 =
 0 x > 02 e−x22d√
2pid
x ≤ 0
.
4This is a straightforward application of the Central Limit Theorem. It is also very easy to derive
directly from the PDF of a normal random variable.
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Now we can calculate the desired probability
Pr[z(1) = z(2)] = Pr[Rd > 0]
=
∫ ∞
0
fR(w) dw
=
∫ ∞
0
f−|D|(w) ∗ f|S|(w) dw
=
∫ ∞
0
4
2pi
√
d(k − d) ·[∫ ∞
−∞
e
−x2
2(k−d) · U(x) · e−(w−x)
2
2d · U(x− w) dx
]
dw
where ∗ denotes the convolution operator and U(x) is the unit step function. By
rearranging the terms we obtain
Pr[z(1) = z(2)] =
4√
2pi(k)
∫ ∞
0
(
1√
2piσ2
∫ ∞
w
e
−(x−µ)2
2σ2 dx
)
e
−w2
2k dw
= 2
∫ ∞
0
1√
2pik
[1− erf(αw)] e−w
2
2k dw
= 2
[∫ ∞
0
e
−w2
2k√
2pik
dw −
∫ ∞
0
e
−w2
2k · erf(αw)√
2pik
dw
]
= 2
[
1
2
− 1
pi
arctan
(
α
√
2k
)]
where σ2 = d(k−d)
k
, µ = σ
2w
d
, erf(x) = 2√
pi
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt and α =
√
d
2k(k−d) . The first of the
two integrations is just a Gaussian over half of the space. As for the second integration
this is a known definite integral. Finally, substituting back with the original variables
n and d we obtain
Pr[z(1) = z(2)] = Fn(d) = 1− 2
pi
arctan
(√
d
n+ 1− d
)
.
From Proposition 4.2.1 we can conclude that the only property which affects the
correlation between two different PUF responses is the Hamming distance between
76 CHAPTER 4. PUFS
the corresponding challenges. Note that the derivation of the above equation was
possible due to the independence assumption made on the components of Y . This
assumption is quite important and should be one of the main metrics judging any
PUF implementation. With large dependencies between yi’s, the entropy inside the
PUF decreases thus limiting its identification capability.
4.3 PUFs Using Tristate Buffers
The original PUF circuit utilized multiplexers (MUXs) to implement the switches.
Each delay unit includes two MUX gates. Instead of having two interleaved delay
paths, we propose a circuit with two separate delay paths. We construct our PUF
circuit utilizing the delay variances of tristate buffers. As we will see this construction
will save on the number of logic gates used.
4.3.1 Tristate Buffers
A generic tristate buffer as shown in Figure 4.3 has three states: logic 1, logic 0
and high impedance (referred to as Hi-Z). If the gate is enabled, the input will be
reflected at the output. If not enabled, the output will become Hi-Z. The truth table
of a tristate buffer is shown in Figure 4.3. The outputs of two tristate buffers can
be connected together to behave as a multiplexer gate. However, when both of the
tristate buffers are enabled, the circuit is under risk of being damaged. If the inputs
of the two tristate buffers are complement values of each other, and the enable inputs
are both high, then the circuit will start heating up and eventually will be damaged.
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OutIn
En
En In Out
0 X Hi-Z
1 0 0
1 1 1
Figure 4.3: A generic tristate buffer
Buf1
Buf0
In OutEn
Figure 4.4: Delay unit built with tristate buffers
4.3.2 Delay Unit
A PUF circuit is based on the delay characteristics of the logic design. We build
our tristate buffer based on the delay unit shown in Figure 4.4. Each delay unit is
constructed by respectively connecting the input and output ports of the two tristate
buffers. The enable ports of these tristate buffers are connected to each other, with
one of the buffers having an inverted enable input. This assures that only one of
the tristate buffer gates will be enabled for a particular enable input value. When
a pulse is applied at the input of this delay unit, it will pass through either Buf0 or
Buf1. The enable input will determine which tristate buffer passes the pulse. This
will change the amount of the delay that this unit contributes according to the value
of the enable signal.
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4.3.3 PUF Circuit
The delay units are cascaded to construct a serial delay path. For our PUF circuit,
we need two separate delay paths. These two delay paths are connected as shown in
Figure 4.5. The inputs of these delay paths are connected together and the outputs
Arbiter
. . .
. . .
C’n/221 C’C’
Cn/2C1 C2
Figure 4.5: PUF architecture built with tristate buffers
are fed to an arbiter. The arbiter will capture the faster path by producing logic 1 or
0 at the output. Assume the arbiter is built with a positive edge-triggered flip-flop.
The upper path is connected to the data input of the flip-flop and the lower path is
connected to its clock input. If the lower path is faster, the rising edge of the clock
signal will arrive before the rising edge of the data signal, therefore producing a logic
0 at the arbiter output. Alternatively, if the upper path is faster we observe the
opposite effect, i.e. the output of the arbiter becomes a logic 1.
4.3.4 Mathematical Model
In this section we show that a tristate PUF is equivalent to a switch-based PUF in
terms of their mathematical model. In particular we show that both implementations
can be modeled using a similar linear model. In the tristate implementation of a
PUF there are two groups of consecutive delay units; the upper and the lower. If
we consider the upper path we notice that in each delay unit there are two possible
paths. Let us call the delay in each of these two paths ai and bi, where i is the stage
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index. Let Hi =
ai+bi
2
and yi =
ai−bi
2
, which means that ai = Hi+ yi and bi = Hi− yi.
Depending on whether the challenge bit is 0 or 1, the signal going through the upper
units will be delayed by Hi+ (−1)ciyi where ci is the ith challenge to the upper delay
units. Assuming that the signal has n/2 stages to propagate through, the total delay
in the upper delay units becomes equal to
DH =
n/2∑
i=1
Hi + (−1)ciyi = τH +
n/2∑
i=1
(−1)ciyi , (4.5)
where τH =
∑n/2
i=1Hi. Similarly, one can derive the delay equation for the lower delay
units. The two delays in each of the paths of the lower delay units can be named
di and fi. Similarly one can make Li =
di+fi
2
and ui =
di−fi
2
. Now if we let c′i be
the challenge bit to the ith stage of the lower units, the delay in each unit becomes
Li + (−1)c′iui. Therefore, the total delay in the lower path becomes:
DL =
n/2∑
i=1
Li + (−1)c′iui = τL +
n/2∑
i=1
(−1)c′iui . (4.6)
The two signals traveling through the upper and lower delay units will interact
through the arbiter. The condition on the output bit becomes:
DH < DL + TS → R = 1
DH > DL + TS → R = 0 ,
where TS is the setup time for the arbiter latch. One can make the two relations more
concise by relating the response bit, (−1)R(DL−DH +Ts) < 0. If we incorporate the
original equations for DL and DH , we get the following response equation:
(−1)R(
n/2∑
i=1
(−1)c′iui − (−1)ciyi + T ) < 0 , (4.7)
where T = τL−τH+TS. Note that T, yi and ui are variables dependent on the circuit.
These variables are dependent on the circuit itself and will vary from one PUF circuit
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to another. For simplicity we assume that n is even and we define Y = [y1, . . . , yn+1]
where yi = ui and yn
2
+i = vi for i = 1 . . .
n
2
, with yn+1 = T . Similarly we rename the
challenge bits as ai = ci and an
2
+i = c
′
i for i = 1 . . .
n
2
. We can compute the output of
the PUF using the following function,
PUFY (a) = sign
(
n∑
i=1
(−1)aiyi + yn+1
)
.5 (4.8)
Where sign(x) = 1 if x ≥ 0, and 0 if x < 0. Note that this is almost identical
to the equation used in Definition 4.2.1. The only difference is that the input bits
are immediately used without the need for the initial transformation U . Of course
Equation 4.8 needs a noise parameter in order to accurately model the actual circuit.
It should be clear that the same modeling that we carried out for MUX-PUFs can
be used here. We will usually refer to the MUX and the tristate PUFs as PUFs or
delay-based PUFs and only specify the implementation type when it is relevant.
4.3.5 Implementation Results
We implemented the proposed tristate PUF and compared it against an implemen-
tation of a switch-based PUF built using multiplexers. The I/O for both circuits
consisted of 64-bit challenge inputs, a single bit pulse input and a response output.
Both designs were developed into Verilog modules and synthesized using the Synopsys
tools Design Compiler and Power Compiler with the TSMC 0.13 µm ASIC library.
The results are shown in Table 4.2.
The implementation results clearly display the superiority of the tristate imple-
mentation over the typical switch-based implementation in terms of design footprint
and power consumption. These are attractive features for low-power devices such
as RFIDs, smart cards and sensor networks. Note that the area (and the power)
consumption of the tristate PUF may be further reduced by custom CMOS design.
5This model is almost identical to the model derived for MUX-based PUFs
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Total Power(uW) Area(Gates)
10MHz 100MHz
Tristate PUF 18.78 152.93 351
MUX-PUF 23.14 193.67 450
Table 4.2: Synthesis results for tristate PUFs
4.4 Summary
In this chapter we explored delay-based PUFs and their constructions. In particular,
we rederive a mathematical model for delay PUFs. We also present a cheaper imple-
mentation of delay PUFs using tristate buffers. And finally, we highlight one major
property of the delay PUF. The main job of this chapter was to set the stage for
PUFs before we can use them in a number of cryptographic schemes with the goal of
creating a secure PUF.
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Chapter 5
PUF-HB
We saw in the last chapter the various attractive properties of PUFs1. However,
PUFs were modelable. In this chapter we will take a new approach in an attempt
to get closer to an actually unclonable function. Our main idea is to merge the
typical PUF circuit along with simple cryptographic primitives which can provide
some level of computational hardness. This will prove to be a fruitful approach as
it will maintain the PUF advantages including the advantages of having a model for
the PUF behavior, while at the same time providing a level of provable security.
The cryptographic primitive we choose for merger with PUFs is an authentication
family labeled HB. In complement to PUFs the HB-based authentication schemes
provide a security reduction. In [46] Hopper and Blum (HB) proposed the first
HB authentication scheme. The HB protocol is indeed promising for simplifying
the authentication process and significantly reducing the power consumption. An
additional major advantage of the HB protocol is that its security is based on the
hard problem learning parity with noise (LPN) which is known to be NP-complete [7].
Unfortunately, as pointed out in [46] the HB scheme is weak against active adversaries.
In [50], Juels and Weis proposed a hardened version of the HB protocol labeled HB+
1As mentioned in Chapter 4 we will use PUF to stand for a delay-based PUF.
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which resists active attacks in the detection based model.2 HB+ was shown to be
secure [50, 53] in the detection based model. In [34], the authors demonstrated a
man-in-the-middle attack for breaking HB+.
In this chapter we merge the PUF authentication scheme along with the HB-based
authentication protocol to produce a hybrid protocol which enjoys the advantages of
both schemes while improving the level of security. The proposed authentication
scheme enjoys a level of tamper resilience, while at the same time being provably
secure against active attacks in the detection based model. In addition, the presented
protocol resists the man-in-the-middle attacks proposed so far for the HB+ scheme.
From the PUF perspective, PUF-HB is the first PUF based authentication scheme
which is provably secure. From the HB perspective PUF-HB is the first hardware HB
implementation with tamper resilience properties. For our security proof we closely
follow the proof presented in [53].
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we give
a review of the previously proposed HB-based authentication protocols. In Section
5.2 we define our notation and describe our protocol. The security reduction is pre-
sented in Section 5.3. In Section 5.4 we describe the known man-in-the-middle attack
against HB+ and show that the proposed protocol resists it. In Section 5.5 we discuss
hardware implementation and tamper resilience properties of the proposed scheme.
5.1 The HB Family
The HB authentication schemes base their security on the hardness of the LPN prob-
lem. In this section we give a quick review of the LPN problem and the different HB
authentication schemes, focusing on HB and HB+. For a certain  ∈ (0, 1
2
)
the LPN
problem is denoted by LPN, and defined as follows.
2In this model, a flag is raised whenever a tag fails to authenticate for a large number of times.
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Definition 5.1.1 ([53]). Given n random binary k-bit strings a(j) and the bits z(j) =
a(j) · x⊕ ν for some x ∈ {0, 1}k, where a · b denotes the binary inner product between
a and b, ν = 1 with probability  and 0 with probability 1 − , then find the binary
string x.
The LPN problem is known to be NP-hard [7]. In [46], the authors show that the
LPN problem is log-uniform and even hard to approximate within a ratio of 2. Kearns
proved in [55] that the LPN problem is hard in the statistical query model. The best
known algorithm to solve the LPN problem is the BKW algorithm [9]. However, there
has been a number of improvements on the algorithm with the best running time of
2O(k/ log k) [26, 69, 74].
In the HB protocol [46], the tag and the reader share a k-bit secret string x. To
authenticate the tag, the reader starts sending randomly generated k-bit challenge
strings a(j). The tag responds with the bit z(j) = a(j) · x⊕ ν where the variables are
as defined in the LPN problem. The tag and the reader repeat the same step for
multiple challenges. Finally, the reader checks to see if the number of errors in the
tag’s response matches the noise level, and decides to accept or reject accordingly.
Note that if the tag’s response did not contain noise, then a passive attacker would
easily be able to deduce x after collecting k challenge-response pairs using Gaussian
elimination. In [46], the authors prove that given an algorithm that predicts z(j) for a
random a(j) with some advantage, then this algorithm can be used to solve the LPN
problem. However, HB is only secure against passive attacks. An active attacker can
easily repeat the same challenge multiple times, effectively eliminating the noise and
reducing the problem to Gaussian elimination.
To secure the HB protocol against an active attacker the HB+ protocol was pro-
posed in [50]. In HB+ the tag and the reader share two k-bit strings x and y. The tag
starts the authentication session by sending a random k-bit string b(j). The reader
then responds with a(j) just like the HB protocol. Finally the tag responds with
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z(j) = a(j) · x ⊕ b(j) · y ⊕ ν, where ν is defined as above. The protocol is proven to
be secure against an active attack on the tag (excluding man-in-the-middle attacks).
In such an adversary model an attacker is not allowed to obtain final decisions from
the reader on whether this authentication session was successful or not. In [50] and
[53] the authors show that in this adversary model breaking the HB+ protocol is
equivalent to solving the LPN problem. However, as we pointed out earlier, a simple
man-in-the-middle attack was demonstrated on the HB+ protocol in [34]. Note that
in a detection based model this attack will not be successful.
In addition to HB and HB+, there has been a number of other variations such as
HB++ [13], HB-MP [76] and HB∗ [21]. All these proposals attempt to prevent man-
in-the-middle attacks. In a more recently proposed scheme, i.e. HB# [33], the authors
propose a modified version of HB+ which uses Toeplitz matrices rather than vectors
for a shared secret. Under a strong conjecture the scheme is proven secure against a
class of man-in-the-middle attacks. In this adversary model which is referred to as
GRS-MIM-model, the attacker can only modify data transmission from the reader to
the tag but not the other way around. This model will protect against the previously
mentioned attack.
5.2 The PUF-HB Authentication Protocol
We start by defining basic notation. In the remainder of this chapter we reserve
k to denote the security variable. T(n,x,Y,s,) denotes the tag used in the PUF-HB
protocol, where x ∈ {0, 1}k, s ∈ {0, 1}2×n where we treat sj as a 2-bit vector. Y =
[y1, y2, . . . , yk+1] such that yi ∈ N(0, 1) and N(µ, σ2) is the normal distribution with
mean µ and variance σ2. The noise parameter is  ∈ (0, 1
2
)
and n denotes the number
of rounds required for authentication. We denote the reader byR(n,x,Y,s,,l,u), where all
the variables are as defined for the tag except l and u which are integers in the range
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[0, n] such that l ≤  · n ≤ u. We also use the following modification to Definition
4.2.1 of Chapter 4. For any bit v,
PUFY,v(a) =
 sign
(∑k
i=1(−1)piyi + yk+1
)
, v = 0
sign
(∑k
i=1(−1)piyi + yk+1
)
, v = 1
 , (5.1)
where pi is the complement of pi.
3 Note that we have eliminated the noise parameter
as we are interested in the mathematical behavior. This notation will simplify the
security proof.
With this notation we describe the basic authentication step. In the jth round of
the protocol, T(n,x,Y,s,) outputs a randomly generated vector b(j) ∈ {0, 1}k and sends it
to R(n,x,Y,s,,l,u). The reader responds with the vector a(j) ∈ {0, 1}k and e(j) ∈ {0, 1}2.
Finally the tag computes z(j) = b(j) · x ⊕ PUFY,e(j)·sj(a(j)) ⊕ ν, where · is the binary
inner product, sj are the j
th two bit vector of s and ν = 1 with probability  and ν = 0
with probability 1−. For authentication, this step is repeated n times. In each round
the reader checks to see if the tag’s response is equal to b(j) · x⊕ PUFY,e(j)·sj(a(j)). If
not, the reader marks the response as wrong. At the end of the nth round, the reader
authenticates the tag if and only if the number of wrong responses is in the range
[l, u].
In general, any entity can interact with the reader and try to impersonate an hon-
est tag. To capture such interaction, let E be any entity trying to authenticate itself
to the reader R(n,x,Y,s,,l,u). Then PUF-HB
(E ,R(n,x,Y,s,,l,u)) = 1 iff E is authenticated
by the reader, and is equal to 0 otherwise. The following protocol formalizes this
interaction:
Provided that E has no information about x, s or Y , the best probability of being
authenticated by the reader will be s = 2
−n∑u
i=l
(
n
i
)
. This probability represents
the soundness error in the algorithm. As for an honest tag T(n,x,Y,s,) one can see
that with a very high probability PUF-HB
(T(n,x,Y,s,),R(n,x,Y,s,,l,u)) = 1. However,
3The complement may be realized by simply XOR-ing the most-significant bit of a with v.
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Protocol 1: PUF-HB
(E ,R(n,x,Y,s,,l,u))
1. R(n,x,Y,s,,l,u) sets c = 0 and j = 1.
2. E sends b(j) ∈ {0, 1}k to R(n,x,Y,s,,l,u).
3. R(n,x,Y,s,,l,u) choses a(j) ∈ {0, 1}k and e(j) ∈ {0, 1}2 uniformly at
random and sends it to E .
4. E sends z(j) to R(n,x,Y,s,,l,u).
5. If z(j) 6= b(j) · x⊕ PUFY,e(j)·sj(a(j)) then c = c+ 1.
6. R(n,x,Y,s,,l,u) increments j and repeats steps 2 through 5 until j = n.
7. If l ≤ c ≤ u then PUF-HB(E ,R(n,x,Y,s,,l,u)) = 1, otherwise it equals 0.
Table 5.1: PUF-HB Protocol
the tag’s choice to set ν = 1 with probability  is independent in each round of the
authentication. Therefore, it will be possible for the tag to introduce a number of
errors which is outside the range [l, u]. This will result in a failed authentication
session. We denote the probability of this incident by c, i.e. the completeness error.
If we set l = 0 then using the Chernoff bound we can produce the following bound,
c < e
−(n)(u/n−1)2/4.
Protocol (1) would work identically if we run it in a parallel fashion. In this case,
the n different b(j) vectors sent in Step 2 would be sent in a single step and similarly all
the a(j) vectors and e(j) bits sent in Step 3 would also be sent in a single step. Finally
all the z(j) bits returned in Step 4 would be sent in a single step. In general, the PUF-
HB protocol is almost identical to the HB+ protocol. The main difference introduced
in the PUF-HB protocol is to substitute the inner product a ·y where y ∈ {0, 1}k with
PUFY,s(a). As we will see in the proof of Theorem 5.3.3 this substitution will not
affect the security features introduced by the HB+ protocol. However, as indicated
in the previous sections this substitution will make the tag tamper-resilient, and will
simultaneously help resist the known man-in-the-middle attack on the HB+ protocol
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[34].
5.3 Security Against Active Attacks
In this section, we reduce the security of the PUF-HB protocol in the active attacker
model (which does not include man-in-the-middle attacks) to solving the LPN prob-
lem. Note that as we pointed out earlier, the proof here closely follows the proof of
Katz et al. on the security of the HB+ protocol [53]. However, due to the nature of
the PUF circuit, a very simple part of the original proof in [53], becomes much more
complex in our protocol. Such a difference is a reflection of the change from a simple
binary inner product to a PUF operation. For a more elaborate explanation of the
proof see [53] where the authors prove security for the parallel execution case with
 < 1/4. Also see [54] for a similar proof when  < 1/2. Moreover, in the original
paper where the HB+ protocol was proposed [50] the authors provide an elegant proof
of security against active attacks. The proof in [50] can easily be modified to prove
the security of the PUF-HB protocol. However, for simplicity and completeness we
use the proof in [53].
We start by quoting the following definitions directly from [53]. Let Ax, denote
an LPN oracle which outputs a k + 1 bit string such that x is chosen uniformly at
random from {0, 1}k and  ∈ (0, 1
2
)
. The output of the oracle is the string
(a, a · x⊕ ν) .
Where a is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}k, and ν = 1 with probability 
and ν = 0 with probability 1− . We also define Uk+1 to be the uniform oracle with
outputs from the uniform distribution over {0, 1}k+1. We say that an algorithm M
can (t, q, δ) solve the LPN problem if
Pr
[
MAx,(1k) = x
] ≥ δ ,
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provided that M runs in time t and uses q queries to the oracle Ax,. The main
theorem of this chapter relies on the following lemma originally due to Regev [85]
and reproven in [53].
Lemma 5.3.1. ([53]) If there exists an algorithm D making q oracle queries, and
running in time t, such that
∣∣Pr [DAx,(1k) = 1]− Pr [DUk+1(1k) = 1]∣∣ ≥ δ ,
then there exist an algorithmM making q′ = O(q·δ−2 log k) oracle queries and running
in time t′ = O(t · kδ−2 log k), such that
Pr
[
MAx,(1k) = x
] ≥ δ/4 .
Before we prove the main theorem of the chapter we try to give some intuition on
why the proof in [53] can be applied to prove the security of the PUF-HB protocol. In
addition, we state two technical lemmas which are needed for the proof of the main
theorem.
First, note that the function computed in the HB+ protocol is z = b · x ⊕ a · y
whereas the function computed in the PUF-HB protocol is z = b · x ⊕ PUFY,s(a).
Moreover, Theorem 5.3.3 states that if there exists an algorithm A which starts by
impersonating a reader to interact with an honest tag T(n,x,Y,s,) (learning phase),
and then impersonates a tag to interact with an honest reader (impersonation phase)
therefore achieving PUF-HB
(A,R(n,x,Y,s,,l,u)) = 1 with high probability, the algo-
rithm A can also be used to distinguish between an LPN oracle and a uniform oracle.
As implied by Lemma 5.3.1, then algorithm A can be used to solve the LPN problem.
In the learning phase, the algorithm A will expect to interact with an honest tag.
In the proof, we impersonate such a tag, and use the oracle outputs to substitute
the b · x part of a tag’s response. Note that this part of the response is in common
between the HB+ protocol and the PUF-HB protocol. Now since we will use an oracle
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for part of the response, this means that we will have no control over x which will be
determined by the oracle. At the same time we will have full control over Y, s (y in
the HB+ protocol).
In the impersonation phase A will take the role of a tag interacting with an honest
reader, and will therefore attempt to correctly compute the responses z(i). However,
the responses of A will depend on the interaction that took place in the learning
phase. If we were successful in providing outputs which were consistent with some
x, then A will be able to provide correct responses in the impersonation phase. This
will be the case if the used oracle was an LPN oracle. On the other hand, if the oracle
was the uniform oracle, then we will have failed in providing consistent outputs to A.
Consequently, the responses z(i) produced by A in the impersonating phase will be
random. While this presents a technique to distinguish between an LPN oracle and a
uniform oracle, nevertheless, we do not have a way to know if the responses z(i) were
correct or not. Primarily because we have no knowledge of x. To resolve this issue we
run the algorithm and acquire the responses for a set of challenges {a1(i)} along with
the {e1(i)} bits, then we rewind the algorithm and acquire a second set of responses
for a different set of challenges {a2(i)} and the {e2(i)} bits. Adding the two responses
cancels out the effect of x and retains the effect of PUFY,e1
(i)
·si(a
1
(i))⊕PUFY,e2(i)·si(a2(i))
(this would be a1(i) · y ⊕ a2(i) · y for the HB+ protocol). With this trick we will have
complete knowledge over the remaining variables. Therefore, we can check whether
the responses retuned by A were correct or not.
What remains to be shown is that given the inputs a1(i) and a
2
(i) and no other infor-
mation, the algorithm A will not be able to predict the output bits PUFY,e1
(i)
·si(a
1
(i))
and PUFY,e2
(i)
·si(a
2
(i)). This is akin to asking the question: How much can be inferred
about the output, by only knowing the input. In the HB+ protocol this becomes a
question of linear independence. However, in the case of PUF-HB the answer becomes
much more complicated. This question was addressed in Proposition 4.2.1 and will be
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further detailed in Lemma 5.3.2. In general, one can see that the function PUFY,s(a)
(compared to a · y) only becomes relevant toward the end of the proof of Theorem
5.3.3. In fact, it should be clear that there is a large family of functions that could
be used in place of PUFY,s(a) or a · y while maintaining the security of the protocol.
However, our choice of PUFY,s(a) was mainly motivated by hardware simplicity and
tamper resilience.
The following lemma connects Proposition 4.2.1 to the main theorem.
Lemma 5.3.2. Let A be an adversary who is given n strings {a(i)}ni=1, where a(i)
is chosen independently and uniformly at random from {0, 1}k. A also knows that
s is chosen uniformly at random form {0, 1}n and that Y0 = [y1, . . . , yk+1] where
yi ∈ N(0, 1) for i = 1, . . . , k and yk+1 = 0. Let z(i) = PUFY0,si(a(i)) then the bits z(i)
will be uniform and independent (from the point of view of A).
Proof. To show that the bits {z(i)}ni=1 are uniform and independent, we need to show
that the probability of z(i) = 0 for any i ∈ [1, n] is 0.5 and that the probability of
z(i) = z(j) for any i, j ∈ [1, n] is 0.5. It is clear that when yk+1 = 0 the output of a
PUF will be balanced. Therefore, it is straightforward to see that when {a(i)}ni=1 are
independent and chosen uniformly at random the bits {z(i)}ni=1 will also be uniformly
distributed. What remains to show is that there is no correlation between the bits
{z(i)}ni=1.
From Proposition 4.2.1 and as can be seen from Equation 4.4 the probability of
any two PUF outputs being equal (or not equal) depends on the Hamming distance
d between P(i) = Ua(i) and P(j) = Ua(j) and not the specific values of a(i) and a(j).
Furthermore, we can deduce from Equation 4.4 that
F k(d) = Pr[z(i) 6= z(j)] = 1− Fk(d) = 2
pi
arctan
(√
d
k − d
)
.
The two probability distributions Fk(d) and F k(d) are reflections of each other around
d = k
2
. Therefore, F k(d) = Fk(k−d). This means that when the probability distribu-
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tion of the Hamming distance between P(i) and P(j) is symmetrized around
k
2
, then z(i)
and z(j) will be uncorrelated. To prove the rest of the lemma, we only need to show
that the probability distribution of the Hamming distances between the different P(i)
strings will be symmetric around k
2
.
The n bit strings {a(i)}ni=1 given to A will induce n(n−1)2 different Hamming dis-
tances between the corresponding P(i) strings. Recall from the lemma that z(i) =
PUFY0,si(a(i)). Therefore, as indicated by Equation 5.1 the PUF circuit will invert
the P(i) strings based on the value of the bit si. From A’s perspective s is chosen
uniformly at random from {0, 1}n. Therefore, each of the P(i) strings will be inverted
with probability 0.5. For any two strings P(i) and P(j), if both of the strings or neither
of them are inverted the Hamming distance d will not be affected. On the other hand,
if only one of the two strings is inverted then the Hamming distance d will become
k − d. Therefore, the Hamming distance between any two strings P(i) and P(j) will
be d with probability 0.5 and will be k − d with probability 0.5. This distribution is
symmetric around k
2
.
We are now ready to prove the main theorem.
Theorem 5.3.3 (Compare to Theorem 3 in [53]). If there exists an adversary A in-
teracting with a tag T(n,x,Y,s,) in at most q executions of the PUF-HB protocol (possibly
concurrently), running in time t such that
Pr
[AT(n,x,Y,s,)(1k) : PUF-HB (A,R(n,x,Y,s,,l,u)) = 1] ≥ δ ,
then these exist an algorithm D making q · n oracle queries, running in time O(t),
and such that∣∣Pr [DAx,(1k) = 1]− Pr [DUk+1(1k) = 1]∣∣ ≥ δ2 − 2−n/2 2u∑
i=0
(
n/2
i
)
− e−n8
Therefore, for any  < 1
8
there is an appropriate choice of n, u such that the last two
terms become negligible, and thus we can conclude that the PUF-HB protocol is secure
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assuming the hardness of the LPN problem.
4
Proof. To prove the theorem we show a construction of the algorithm D. As stated
by the theorem, D is given access to an oracle returning (k+1)-bit strings which can
be broken to (b¯, z¯), where b¯ ∈ {0, 1}k and z¯ ∈ {0, 1}. D proceeds as follows:
1. D starts by choosing vectors Y0 and s such that yk+1 is set to 0, and then
the k remaining yi values are chosen from N(0, 1). The bit-string s is chosen
uniformly at random from {0, 1}2×n. D runs the algorithm A which will expect
to interact with a PUF-HB tag. In order to impersonate a real tag, D does
the following to simulate a basic authentication step: D starts by obtaining a
k+1 bit string (b¯(i), z¯(i)) from the oracle, and then sends b¯(i) to A as the initial
b in Protocol 1. A will reply with a challenge a¯(i) and the bits e¯(i). Next, D
computes z(i) = z¯(i)⊕PUFY0,e¯(i)·si(a¯(i)) and sends z(i) back to A. D repeats this
step q · n times.
2. In the second phase of the algorithm, A tries to impersonate an honest tag.
Looking at the parallel execution of PUF-HB,A starts by sending b(1), . . . , b(n) ∈
{0, 1}k to a reader. Next, D randomly choses a1(1), . . . , a1(n) ∈ {0, 1}k and
e1(1), . . . , e
1
(n) ∈ {0, 1}2 and send them back to A, which will in turn respond
with the bits z1(1), . . . , z
1
(n). D then rewinds A and sends randomly chosen
a2(1), . . . a
2
(n) ∈ {0, 1}k and e2(1), . . . , e2(n) ∈ {0, 1}2. A will respond with z2(1), . . . , z2(n).
Note that since the algorithm was rewound the same b values will be sent by A.
3. D calculates z⊕(i) = z
1
(i) ⊕ z2(i) and lets Z⊕ = (z⊕(1), . . . , z⊕(n)). D also computes
zˆ(i) = PUFY0,e1(i)·si(a
1
(i)) ⊕ PUFY0,e2(i)·si(a2(i)) and lets Zˆ = (zˆ(1), . . . , zˆ(n)). D out-
puts 1 iff Z⊕ and Zˆ differ in at most 2u positions.
4Note that by parametering the length ` of the strings si ∈ {0, 1}` and e(i) ∈ {0, 1}` we may
achieve some flexibility in the parameters, i.e.  < 0.25− 2−(`+1).
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Now we analyze D:
Case 1: If the oracle used by D was the uniform oracle Uk+1, then the outputs
z¯ given to D in step 1 were uniformly distributed and independent of everything.
This means that the bits z(i) which D sent back to A in step 1 were also uniformly
distributed and independent of everything. Therefore, by the end of step 1 A has no
information about either Y0 or s. All A receives in the second step are the inputs
{a1(i)}ni=1, {e1(i)}ni=1 and {a2(i)}ni=1, {e2(i)}ni=1. All of these inputs are uniformly and
independently distributed. As shown in Lemma 5.3.2 each of the two calculated
output strings {PUFY0,e1(i)·si(a1(i))}ni=1 and {PUFY0,e2(i)·si(a2(i))}ni=1 will be uniform over
{0, 1}n (from the point of view of A). However, when we add these two variables
and obtain Zˆ the individual bits of the output will not always be independent. The
affect of the si bits will actually cancel out from both terms when e
1
(i) = e
2
(i) with
probability 0.25. To simplify the proof, we assume in this case that the outputs are
completely dependent. Using the Chernoff approximation we bound the probability
of observing more than n/2 dependent output bits by e−
n
8 . The probability that Z⊕
and Zˆ differ in at most 2u positions is exactly 2−n/2
∑u
i=0
(
n/2
i
)
. We conclude that D
outputs 1 in this case with probability at most 2−n/2
∑2u
i=0
(
n/2
i
)
+ e−
n
8 .
Case 2: If D is using the oracle Ax, for some random x, the simulation provided
by D in the first phase will be perfect and therefore A will be able to impersonate
an honest tag with probability at least δ. Let w be the randomness used in the first
phase of running A, then we denote the probability that A succeeds in impersonating
an honest tag for a fixed choice of w by δw. Now since we rewind the algorithm, the
probability that A succeeds in both rounds is δ2w. Let E(δ2w) denote the expected
value of δ2w over all possible randomness w, then we have
E(δ2w) ≥ E(δw)2 = δ2,
where the square is taken out of the expected value operator using Jensen’s inequality.
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Now assuming that A succeeds in impersonating an honest tag for both rounds, then
we would expect each of the response strings z1(1), . . . , z
1
(n) and z
2
(1), . . . , z
2
(n) to have at
most u errors. Therefore Z⊕ will in turn have at most 2u errors.5 When we add z1(i)
and z2(i) to generate z
⊕
i we are canceling the effect of b · x and therefore we are left
with z⊕(i) = PUFY0,e1(i)·si(a
1
(i))⊕ PUFY0,e2(i)·si(a2(i)). With the exception of the 2u errors
in Z⊕, the strings Zˆ and Z⊕ are calculating the same output. We conclude that D
outputs 1 in this case with probability at least δ2.
This concludes our security proof, and shows that the PUF-HB protocol is secure
against an active attacker provided that the LPN problem is hard to solve.
5.4 Man-in-the-Middle Attacks
The main weakness of the HB+ protocol is the man-in-the-middle attack proposed
in [34]. Briefly summarized, in this attack an adversary replaces all the challenges
{a(j)}nj=1 sent from the reader in a single authentication session by {a(j) ⊕ w}nj=1
where w ∈ {0, 1}k. The attacker knows that the challenges will interact with the
secret y through a(j) · y. At the end of the n rounds, if the reader authenticates the
tag, the adversary can deduce with very high probability that his changes did not
affect the responses of the tag, and therefore w · y = 0. On the other hand, if the
reader rejects the tag, then the adversary will know with a very high probability that
w · y = 1. Repeating the same attack k times will allow the adversary to collect
k linear equations in y. The adversary can use Gaussian elimination to recover the
secret y. Similarly, the same attack can be carried out to deduce the other secret
string x.
In the PUF-HB scheme this particular man-in-the-middle attack will not succeed
due to the non-linearity of the PUF function. From Proposition 4.2.1 we know that
5This worst case happens when the u errors in z1(i) and z
2
(i) affect completely different bits.
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the only type of correlations that the attacker can exploit are those related to the
Hamming distance between the different input strings a. However, we saw in Lemma
5.3.2 that with the secret string s the Hamming distance information is masked for
a single authentication session. It is still possible that an adversary can exploit
Hamming distances between different sessions to launch an attack. Another potential
point of weakness is the linearity in the b · x portion of the PUF-HB protocol. To
protect against simple attacks exploiting this linearity, a second PUF circuit can be
used with the b vector as its input. We label such a protocol PUF2-HB, since it will
essentially be identical to Protocol 1, with the only difference in the z bit calculated
by the tag, which becomes
z(i) = b(i) · x⊕ PUFY1,si(a(i))⊕ PUFY2(b(i))⊕ ν (5.2)
where the shared secret becomes (x, Y1, Y2, s).
5.5 Hardware Security
In the previous section we discussed the security of the proposed scheme under ab-
stract security models. However, in recent years we have seen numerous side-channel
attacks which directly target the hardware implementation. The PUF paradigm was
aimed at protecting against active side-channel attacks. In the PUF-HB protocol
there are only two strings that are to be stored by the tag: x and s. The secret Y is
not really stored since it is part of the characteristics of the circuit itself. In Chapter
4 we discussed the resilience of PUF circuits against hardware attacks. In particular,
PUF prevents an attacker from measuring the yi parameters directly via a physical
measurement. Any major changes to the surrounding temperatures or voltage levels,
or any attempt to forcefully read the value of these registers will induce a change to
the PUF, therefore changing the identity of the tag.
What is more impressive about the PUF circuit is that it even protects neighboring
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components. This is achieved by placing all registers containing the secret strings x
and s sufficiently close to the PUF circuit. Such a level of security ensures that
even when the tag itself is compromised, an attacker cannot impersonate this tag by
extracting the secrets from the hardware. We can not quantify this ability of a PUF.
Naturally, one might be concerned about how that will affect the modelability of
the PUF in the pre-deployment phase. Before deployment of the tag, the registers are
initialized to their secret values. Afterward, with the knowledge of the secret vectors
the reader can develop an accurate model for the PUF circuit. Note that modeling
the PUF is even possible in the existence of noise [8]. Hence, the sensitivity of the
PUF does not prevent the owner from modeling it.
Finally we would like to underline that PUF-HB is not inherently protected against
passive attacks, e.g. Simple Power Analysis and Differential Power Analysis. Al-
though not trivial, side-channel profiles may be utilized to recover the secret values.
If passive side-channel attacks are a concern, standard IC level power balancing tech-
niques [92, 93, 84] must be employed. Although effective, these techniques tend to
incur significant area overhead. An alternative approach would be to modify the
implementation to balance the power consumption.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter we merged the PUF authentication scheme with the HB-based au-
thentication protocol, with the goal of producing a hybrid protocol which enjoys the
advantages of both schemes while improving the level of security. The main con-
tribution of this chapter is the proposed PUF-HB authentication scheme which is
tamper resilient, and at the same time provably secure against active attacks in the
detection based model. In addition, the proposed protocol resists the known man-in-
the-middle attacks against the HB+ scheme. Although this proposal enjoys a number
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of advantages, it still raises a number of concerns preventing it from being considered
an unclonable function. First, the man-in-the-middle security is not proven for all
attackers. Second, the side-channel security is also a concern as it is not clear whether
there is information leakage. In the next chapter we will present another variant of
PUF-HB which targets a simple security reduction with an efficient hardware imple-
mentation.
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Chapter 6
HB+PUF
In this chapter we present a proof of concept implementation for HB+PUF, a variant
of PUF-HB. The HB+PUF protocol enjoys the same properties of PUF-HB with a
much simpler security reduction. Our implementation takes advantage of the PUF
circuit in order to produce the random bits typically needed for an HB-based authen-
tication scheme. Note that the existence of a random number generator (RNG) is
assumed in all HB-based protocols without taking into account the complexity of such
a device. The overall circuit is shown to occupy a few thousand gates. This small
gate count is achieved by using the tristate PUF and by serializing the operation.
We note here that although the HB+PUF proposal seems stronger than PUF-HB in
terms of resisting man-in-the-middle attacks it will not change the general security
claims of PUF-HB.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.1 we define
our notation and describe our proposed protocol. The security analysis is presented
in Section 6.2. In Section 6.3 we describe our RNG construction and present analysis
of its randomness. Section 6.4 describes the proof of concept implementation of the
entire circuit. Finally, we present the summary in Section 6.5.
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6.1 New Authentication Family: HB+PUF
In this section we present the proposed protocol. We will use R to denote the reader
and T to denote the tag. n1 and n2 will be our security parameters. T and R are
both characterized by the set of variables (k, s1, s2, x, Y, P , , u) where s1, x ∈ {0, 1}n1 ,
s2 ∈ {0, 1}n2 and Y = [y1, y2, . . . , yn1+1] such that yi ∈ N(0, 1) where N(µ, σ2) is the
normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ2. The noise parameters are , P ∈(
0, 1
2
)
. We use k to denote the number of rounds required for authentication. The last
variable u is an integer in the range [0, n] such that fk ≤ u, where f = P + − 2p
denotes the total noise in the scheme.
Next, we introduce an enhancement to the delay-based PUF. We use an n-bit
non-zero binary string x to implement a linear bijection on the input challenge before
it is fed into the PUF. Let a be the challenge string sent to the PUF. To produce the
actual challenge string a′ we treat x and a as elements of a finite field GF (2n) and
compute the product a′ = xa ∈ GF (2n). We next define a new PUF equation which
takes this enhancement as well as the error in modeling the PUF into consideration 1
PUFY,x,p(a) = PUFY (xa)⊕ ν , (6.1)
where ν = 1 with probability P and ν = 0 with probability 1 − P . The field
multiplication may be implemented with low footprint using a simple linear feedback
shift register (LFSR) based serial modular polynomial multiplier circuit. The choice
of generating polynomial makes no difference in terms of the properties of the PUF
device. Hence, for efficiency, low weight polynomials (e.g. trinomials) may be used in
the implementation [6]. Keep in mind that in this chapter we will use tristate PUFs.
With this notation we describe the basic authentication step. In every round, T
randomly generates b ∈ {0, 1}n2 and sends it to R. Upon reception R replies with
1While this enhancement does not prevent modeling attacks, it will indeed have an affect on the
man-in-the-middle attacks as we will see in Section 6.2.
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Protocol 2 (HB+PUF): 〈E ,Rσ〉
1. Rσ sets the counter c = 0
2. E sends b ∈ {0, 1}n2 to Rσ
3. Rσ choses a ∈ {0, 1}n1 uniformly at random and sends it to E
4. E sends z to Rσ
5. if z 6= a · s1 ⊕ b · s2 ⊕ PUFY,x,0(a) then c = c+ 1
6. Steps 2 through 5 are repeated for k iterations
7. If c ≤ u then 〈E ,Rσ〉 = 1, otherwise it equals 0.
Table 6.1: HB+PUF Protocol
the challenge a ∈ {0, 1}n1 . Finally, T computes
z = a · s1 ⊕ b · s2 ⊕ PUFY,x,p(a)⊕ ν , (6.2)
where ν = 1 with probability  and 0 with probability 1− . Notice that this is very
similar to the basic authentication step in HB+. The only difference is that here we
add a PUF operation. In order forR to authenticate T , the same basic authentication
step is repeated for k rounds. In every round R checks to see if T ’s response is equal
to (a · s1 ⊕ b · s2 ⊕ PUFY,x,0(a)). If the response is not equal to this term, R marks
the response wrong. At the end of the kth round, R authenticates T if and only if
the number of wrong responses is less than u.
In general, any entity can interact with the reader and try to impersonate an
honest tag. To capture such interaction, let E be any entity trying to authenticate
itself to the reader Rσ characterized by σ = (k, s1, s2, x, Y, p, , u). Following the
notation in [53] we define 〈E ,Rσ〉 := 1 iff E is authenticated by the reader, and is
equal to 0 otherwise. The following protocol formalizes this interaction:
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6.2 Security Analysis
In this section we show that the proposed protocol HB+PUF is at least as secure
as the HB+ protocol. We also discuss security against man-in-the-middle attacks.
Finally, we consider the parameter selection to obtain a secure implementation. The
reduction from HB+PUF to HB+ is in fact very simple. As can be seen from Equation
6.2, the HB+PUF protocol utilizes all the terms of HB+, and only adds a PUF
operation. Therefore, it should be expected that the HB+PUF protocol can not be
less secure than the HB+ protocol. We now formalize this intuition by showing that
any algorithm capable of successfully attacking the HB+PUF protocol can be used
to successfully attack HB+. The HB+ protocol uses a tag T +τ and a reader R+τ both
of which can be characterized by the string of variables τ = (k, s1, s2, , u). The
variables in τ are defined as we have done for the HB+PUF variables in Section 6.1.
We also use 〈E ,R+τ 〉 to indicate an authentication session between any entity E and
an HB+ reader R+τ using the HB+ protocol. Similar to Protocol 1, 〈E ,R+τ 〉 = 1 when
the reader authenticates and 0 otherwise. This notation mostly follows the work
presented in [53]. Recall from the previous section that in the HB+PUF protocol
we use a tag Tσ and a reader Rσ both of which can be characterized by the string
of variables σ = (k, s1, s2, x, Y, p, , u). We next prove the reduction in the active
attacker model used to prove the security of the HB+ protocol. In this model the
attacker interacts with the tag in a learning session before he attempts to impersonate
as the tag to an honest reader2.
Theorem 6.2.1. Let A be an algorithm which interacts with an honest HB+PUF
tag Tσ for q authentication sessions to achieve Pr[〈A,Rσ〉 = 1]> δ, where Rσ is an
honest HB+PUF reader. Then, there exists an algorithm A′ which can interact with
any HB+ tag T +τ for q authentication sessions to achieve Pr[〈A′,R+τ 〉 = 1]> δ, where
2We only need HB+ to prove the reduction to the LPN problem. However, HB+ is reduced to
the LPN problem under the same attacker model used here.
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R+τ is an honest HB+ reader.
Proof. The basic operation of A′ is to map a given τ = (k+, s+1 , s+2 , +, u+) charac-
terizing the HB+ tag and reader to σ = (k, s1, s2, x, Y, p, , u) used to characterize
an HB+PUF tag and reader. Note that all the variables in the HB+ protocol are
still used in the same manner in the HB+PUF protocol. Therefore, we can create
σ+ =
(
k = k+, s1 = s
+
1 , s2 = s
+
2 , x, Y,  = 
+, p = 0, u = u
+
)
. The variable x is cho-
sen randomly to be any string in {0, 1}n1 . The (n1 + 1) real vector Y is chosen such
that yi ∈ N(0, 1). A′ runs as follows: It initializes A and allows it to carry its com-
munication with T +τ . In particular, A′ pass the vector b sent by T +τ to A which will
reply with the vector a. Again A passes a back to T +τ . Finally, when T +τ returns its
response z, A′ returns zˆ = z ⊕ PUFY,x,0(a) to A. The same step is followed for all q
authentication rounds between T +τ and A. When A′ wants to authenticate itself to
R+τ , it again runs A in its authentication phase. A will start by sending the random
string b(i). A′ will pass the string directly to R+τ which will respond with the vector
a(i). A′ passes a(i) back to A. Finally, when A returns its response z(i), A′ returns
zˆ(i) = z(i) ⊕ PUFY,x,0(a(i)) to R+τ . The algorithm A′ repeats these steps for all k
rounds of the authentication session, such that i = 1 . . . k.
To see why this will actually work, notice that in the first q rounds A is getting the
response zˆ which is effectively responses from a tag Tσ+ . This means that at the end
of the q authentication sessions A will have effectively communicated with Tσ+ . In the
authentication phase, when A′ tries to authenticate itself to R+τ , it uses the algorithm
A which will be trying to authenticate itself to Rσ+ . Assuming that A will succeed
in impersonating Tσ+ with probability larger than δ, then the responses returned by
A which are z(i) will match the responses of an honest tag with probability larger
than δ. However, this immediately implies that the responses returned by A′ to R+τ
which are zˆ(i) and which differ from z(i) with the term PUFY,x,0(a
(i)) will match the
responses of an honest tag with probability larger than δ. Therefore, A′ should also
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succeed in impersonating a tag T +τ with probability larger than δ.
We point out that in the PUF-HB scheme the security reduction is much more
involved since the secret s1 is replaced by the PUF operation. Theorem 6.2.1 poses
an immediate question of how the HB+PUF protocol behaves in relation to the the
known man-in-the-middle attack against HB+ [34]. As we pointed out earlier, one
of the main reasons for such an attack to work is the linearity of the inner product
operation. In our scheme the challenges a(j) are not only subjected to the inner
product operation a(j) · s1, but also to a PUF operation a(j) · s1 ⊕ PUFY,x,p(a(j)).
With both operations being used, an adversary will need to find a way to modify
the challenges such that he can deduce information about each of the two operations
separately. To see why a PUF operation will help against the man-in-the-middle
attacks, notice that on one hand the PUF is inherently non-linear due to the sign
operation. Therefore, it will prevent against any simple man-in-the-middle attack
trying to explore linearity, such as the attack in [34]. On the other hand, it has been
shown in Chapter 4 that the probability distribution of two different challenges a(1)
and a(2) yielding the same output from a PUF operation, will only depend on the
Hamming distance between a(1) and a(2). This means that any successful man-in-
the-middle attack would have to exploit the Hamming distances between different
challenges. However, recall from the end of Section 6.1 that the PUF circuit used in
HB+PUF implements a field multiplication over GF (2n1) with the secret string x.
This multiplication will essentially obfuscate the Hamming distance between different
challenges. Therefore, the attacker’s ability to deduce any correlation between the
inputs and the outputs of the PUF is eliminated. In conclusion, we claim that the
addition of a PUF to the authentication scheme will in effect render a man-in-the-
middle attack quite difficult.
Note that here we are talking with respect to the GRS-MIM model introduced
in [33]. To protect against the most general class of man-in-the-middle attacks, we
6.3. PUF-BASED RNG 107
suggest adding a second PUF circuit to operate on the b(j) strings sent by the tag. In
such a scheme the response of the tag would be
z = a · s1 ⊕ b · s2 ⊕ PUFY1,x1,p1(a)⊕ PUFY2,x2,p2(b)⊕ ν . (6.3)
The suggested scheme will be more demanding in terms of hardware and power.
However, we predict that it could be resilient against man-in-the-middle attacks.
We finish this section by discussing security parameters for an implementation of
the design. As shown by Theorem 1 our protocol is at least as secure as the HB+
protocol, which in turn is at least as hard as solving the LPN problem. All with
respect to the active attacker model. In [69] the authors give a careful study of the
BKW algorithm for solving the LPN problem. They conclude that the parameters
first introduced for the HB+ protocol by [50] and then by [53] do not provide sufficient
security. In our implementation we follow the new parameters suggested by [69] and
later adopted by [33]. To achieve 80-bits of security we choose n1 = 80, n2 = 512,
f = 0.15 and k = 200. f is not a separate parameter but rather a result from p
and . In our implementation we will have p = 0.15 and  = 0.
6.3 PUF-based RNG
In Chapter 4 we discussed the inherent metastability in a PUF circuit. As we pointed
out earlier, these metastable states result from either environmental fluctuations, or
race conditions which occur between the two propagating signals inside a PUF. In
this section, we outline how metastability could be used to generate random bits.
We note here that using a PUF circuit as an RNG is not a new idea. It has been
previously proposed in [77]. In their design the authors use an LFSR to generate
a stream of challenges. Each challenge is fed to the PUF multiple times in order to
decide whether the challenge is metastable or not. Finally, the metastable outputs are
used to extract randomness. In our approach, we take advantage of a PUF feedback
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setting. This approach will essentially remove any need to separately check each
challenge for metastability. Therefore, decreasing the control logic, and increasing
the throughput.
Our RNG design is based on a shift register feeding a PUF circuit in parallel.
As we have concluded in Section 6.2 the size of the PUF and thus the size of the
shift register will be 80 bits. The register is initialized to a random bit string. At
every clock cycle the output of the PUF is fed back to the most significant bit of the
shift register, while the least significant bit is discarded. This mode of operation will
ensure a continuous stream of bits. Without metastability no randomness is expected
to come out of this construction. Therefore, to assess the generated randomness we
need to get a good estimate on the ratio of metastable points.
In order to get an estimate for the metastability ratio, we implemented the PUF
circuit on a Xilinx XC2VP30 FPGA. In typical PUF implementations, extra precau-
tions are taken to prevent metastability. However, we are interested in having a high
level of metastability. This is the case, since we use the PUF in a noisy authentica-
tion scheme, and as an RNG. To help induce a higher level of metastability we allow
close adjacency between the PUF circuit and other parts of the implementation. We
carried out a restart test by collecting 1000 different bit streams. Each bit stream
was collected after the system was reseted and initialized to the same state. In a
completely stable system, these bit streams would have to be identical. However,
in a metastable system, every time a metastable point occurs these streams are ex-
pected to break into two groups. With each group following a different choice of the
metastable point. After tracking all the bit streams we found that after 6400 bits all
the 1000 streams were in completely different states, therefore suggesting the occur-
rence of 1000 metastable points. This yields an overall metastability ratio of about
15%. With this ratio, we can insure that the output always contains a metastable
point by XOR-ing every 8 consecutive bits and using the result as the output of the
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Test Name Proportion
Frequency 100%
Frequency within block 100%
Longest run of ones in block 95%
Cumulative sum 100%
Runs 100%
Discrete Fourier Transform 100%
Non-overlapping template matching 95%
Overlapping template matching 97.5%
Maurer’s Universal 100%
Approximate Entropy 97.5%
Serial 97.5%
Lempel-Ziv Complexity 100%
.
Table 6.2: NIST suite results for PUF-RNG
RNG.
To verify the statistical quality of the RNG output, we collected a large number of
bit streams and analyzed them with the NIST statistical test suite. As recommended
by the NIST tools, every bit stream contained 20, 000 points. The test suite reports
a proportion value, which reflects the ratio of bit streams which actually passed this
particular test. The final results we obtained are shown in Table 6.2. The NIST tools
return a statistical result where even a true random number generator could fail in
some of the runs. We can conclude from the shown results that the proposed RNG
is a reasonably good generator.
6.4 Implementation
The authentication scheme presented in Section 6.1 is implemented as shown in Fig-
ure 6.1. The PUF circuit is positioned at the center of the implementation to ensure
tamper-resilience for the entire circuit. As we have verified from our FPGA imple-
mentations of a PUF circuit, any change in the surrounding hardware to the PUF
circuit will result in changing the PUF’s internal variables. We point out here that
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a PUF can easily protect against active side-channel attacks. However, for passive
side-channel attacks a designer might have to resort to standard power balancing tech-
niques [92, 93, 84]. Although effective, these technique will incur about 200 − 400%
area overhead. A cost too high for lighweight implementations. Our authentication
architecture runs in two different modes of operation during the entire protocol.
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Figure 6.1: HB+PUF Authentication Scheme
RNG Mode: In this mode the PUF circuit acts as a random number generator. As
explained in Section 6.3 the random string b ∈ {0, 1}512 is achieved using a shift regis-
ter along with the PUF circuit. This shift register is initialized with the initialization
value (IV) stored in an 80 − bit ROM structure. The shift register will be serially
initialized to (IV) in RNG mode. For the remainder of the RNG operation the serial
input of the shift register will be fed back by the output of the PUF. Conveniently
enough, we do not need to store the entire random string b generated by the PUF. As
b is generated 1 bit at a time, we can serially compute the inner product b · s2, and at
the same time serially transmit b to the reader. It is important to point out that in
the RNG mode, the system will not be able to detect any active side-channel attacks.
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With a stream of random bits, the attacker’s effects are gone undetectable. This will
not be a major problem since any invasive attack on the circuit will permanently
affect the PUF circuit. Therefore, as soon as the circuit is back to PUF mode, the
attack can be detected. In the case where more gates are dedicated for security pur-
poses, two separate PUF circuit can be used for authentication and random number
generation.
PUF Mode: In this mode we perform the serial field multiplication xa which will
be the input of the PUF. The hardware component Shift Register/Serial Multiplier
shown in Figure 6.1 is used for this multiplication. The serial input of this shift
register comes from the input a which is serially received. The field multiplication
is realized through an LFSR serial multiplier, and is carried out in parallel with the
inner product operation a · s1. These two operations will operate serially and will
take about 80 cycles. The result of the field multiplication xa is fed to the PUF as
the challenge input. The response bit of the PUF is then XOR-ed with the inner
products a · s1 and b · s2. Finally, the response of the entire circuit r is transmitted
to the reader. Note from the last section that the ratio of metastability was about
15%. This matches the overall desired noise. Therefore, there will be no need for an
added noise parameter .
To estimate the gate count, HB+PUF was developed into a Verilog modules and
synthesized using the Synopses Design Compiler. In the synthesis we used the TSMC
0.13 µm ASIC library. The circuit components and their gate count are explained as
follows:
-ROM Structure: The IV for the RNG and the private keys s1 and s2 are stored
inside the hardware and they are unique for each tag. Instead of utilizing flip-flops to
store these values, we designed a ROM structure for low-area storage. To minimize
the area usage, we used a design similar to a look-up table. Separate architectures
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are needed to store s1, s2 and IV. Since s2 is 512 bits, s1 and IV are 80 bits, we have
672 bits of total ROM area. Synthesis results show that 110 gates are required for
this storage.
-PUF Circuit: In our authentication scheme, we utilize an 80-bit PUF circuit.
As pointed out in Section 6.1 we use the tristate PUF implementation presented in
Chapter 4. This particular PUF implementation is of interest due to its low-power
and low-area features. When we used the tristate PUF design our synthesis results
showed the area of the PUF to be 450 gates. However, with custom circuit design,
where each tristate buffer utilized about a single gate this number was reduced to 160
gates.
-Shift register/Serial Multiplier: The shift register has a total size of 80 bits. The
structure also contains a number of XOR gates used to achieve the field multiplication.
In addition, 2-1 multiplexers are used to decide which inputs feed the individual flip-
flops of the register. Synthesis results show that a total equivalent of 500 gates is
needed for this structure.
-Serial inner products: The AND and XOR components shown in Figure 6.1 are
utilized for serial inner product operations. The boxes labeled as s2 · b and s1 · a are
single flip-flops storing the results of the inner products s2 · b and s1 · a of Protocol 1.
They work as accumulators. In each clock cycle, one bit of s2 and one bit of b pass
through an AND gate and the result is XORed with the value in the accumulator
flip-flop. The same procedure is repeated for s1 and a. At the end, the results in the
accumulator registers s2 · b and s1 · a are XOR-ed with the result of the PUFY,(xa)
and the result is sent to the output as r. The area for these operations is estimated
at 50 gates.
-Control logic: The control logic for this scheme is quite simple. For the ROM
structures storing s1 and s2, a single 9-bit counter is needed. Since the inner products
for s1 and s2 are operated in parallel, a single counter is enough for both operations.
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For the RNG a 3-bit counter is needed to track the XOR-ing of each 8 consecutive
bits. This can be interleaved with the inner product operation s2 ·b. The architecture
has only 2 modes of operation. Therefore, a single flip-flop would suffice to track the
state of the hardware. The total area of the control block is estimated at about 150
gates.
The total area of the authentication hardware is 970 gates. This is below 1K
gates, a typical threshold for the RFID’s footprint allotted for security [82].
6.5 Summary
In this chapter we proposed a scheme which seems resilient against certain man-in-
the-middle attacks. We also demonstrated an efficient method for generating the
random bits needed for our proposed protocol. This was done without incurring
significant overhead to the hardware, and by reutilizing parts of the authentication
circuit. As can be seen the HB+PUF proposal is very similar to the PUF-HB of the
previous chapter. However, the proposal of this chapter targets takes a more practical
approach and focuses on the implementation. One of the minor yet important contri-
butions here is the introduction of an enhanced version of PUFs which incorporates a
field multiplication (see Equation 6.1). Although this enhancement does not prevent
modeling PUFs, it does have the potential to improve its behavior under different
inputs.
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Chapter 7
Two Level PUFs
In the previous two chapters we saw how to improve the security of a simple PUF
by combining it with HB. In this chapter we show that PUFs alone can be used to
create a secure challenge response authentication scheme. In specific, we present a
new primitive which is the 2-level PUF. Learning the proposed scheme in the pas-
sive attacker model is reduced to learning a special class of a threshold of majority
gates under the uniform distribution. Furthermore, we explore extensions of PUFs
to produce efficient n-to-n mappings. So far, PUFs have only been used as a boolean
function. It should be interesting to see different ways of creating n-to-n mappings.
In Section 7.1, we define new PUF-based n-to-n mappings which we use in our
proposed scheme. In Section 7.2 we define the proposed protocol and discuss how it
can be modeled and deployed. In Section 7.3 we present the security analysis of the
proposed protocol. We finally conclude with a summary in Section 7.4.
7.1 Beyond a Single PUF
In this section we will introduce some variations of the simple PUF scheme. In Chap-
ter 4, we pointed out that attempting to model a PUF circuit will always have some
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inaccuracy which we refer to as noise. In this section we explore methods for con-
structing a {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n mapping using a PUF circuit. The most straightforward
way to produce such a mapping is to concatenate n different PUF circuits. We refer
to this construction as a PUF-box. Note that these definitions will be variants of
Definition 4.2.1.
Definition 7.1.1. A noisy PUF-box is a function characterized by the matrix M ∈
R
n+1×n and the noise parameter  ∈ (0, 1
2
)
, such that M ’s (i, j) entry mi,j ∈ N(0, 1).
PUFbM,(C) : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, Z = PUFbM,(C) where
zj = sign
(
n∑
i=1
(−1)pimi,j +mn+1,j
)
+ ν . (7.1)
The vector Z is defined as Z = [zi . . . zn], and the variables ν and pi are defined as in
Definition 4.2.1.
The notion of a PUF-box has not been previously defined in this manner. However,
there has been schemes proposed where the PUF is assumed to be an n-to-n mapping
without an explanation of how this would be achieved [12]. In reality, a PUF-box is
inefficient in terms of gate count. It would require O(n2) gates, which can become
large even for a low security parameter. Our definition of a PUF-box is mainly used
as a transitional step in order to define a more realistic n-to-n PUF-based mapping.
We next introduce a Simulated PUF-Box (SPB). We first explain the intuition
behind such a construction. A PUF-box is characterized by n(n+ 1) variables. Each
of these variables is only used in one of the PUFs inside the PUF-box. This large
number of variables is the source of inefficiency. To solve this problem in the SPB, we
only use two PUF circuits. In particular, we use a random n-bit string S to choose
a path which utilizes different parts of the two PUF circuits. In the ith stage of the
SPB, the signal either goes through the first or the second PUF depending on the
corresponding bit si. If we label the delay mismatch in the i
th stage of the first and
second PUF as yi,0 and yi,1 respectively, then si will basically be choosing to use
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yi,0 or yi,1 in the delay equation. This means that with only 2(n + 1) variables, we
can generate 2n different PUFs, each corresponding to a different S string. A large
number of these PUFs will have a similar behavior. However, if the S’s are chosen to
have a large pairwise hamming distance, the resulting PUFs will have a sufficiently
different output behavior.
A single S string will result in having a single PUF. Therefore, we need n different
S strings in order to simulate a PUF-box. The storage of n different S strings would
be as costly as the PUF-box. To solve this problem, we introduce a simple LFSR [6].
The LFSR will behave as a schedule for the n different S strings. To run the SPB, the
LFSR is initialized to a randomly pre-chosen state S0. The challenge is then fed to
the switches of the two internal PUF circuits. As indicated earlier, the string S0 will
induce a PUF with delay variables chosen out of the two existing PUF circuits. When
a pulse is sent down the switch chain, a single output bit will be generated. Next, the
LFSR runs for n cycles, therefore generating the new state S1. This new state will
induce a second PUF circuit with different delay variables, and will therefore produce
the second output bit. Continuing in this fashion for n iterations, we obtain an n-bit
output for the n-bit challenge input. At the end of the nth iteration the LFSR is
reset to the original state S0. Note that while this construction saves on the number
of gates used, it will require O(n2) clock cycles before generating an n-bit output.
Our interest in this chapter is directed towards a smaller size circuit. Therefore, the
time/size trade off presented by the SPB will be ideal. We now formally define a
noisy SPB.
Definition 7.1.2. A noisy SPB is a function characterized by the vectors Y 0, Y 1 ∈
R
n+1, the noise parameter  ∈ (0, 1
2
)
, the initial bit string S0 ∈ {0, 1}n and an LFSR
function L. Such that Y j = [y1,j, . . . , yn+1,j] and yi,j ∈ N(0, 1). SPBY 0,Y 1,S0,L,(C) :
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{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n such that Z = SPBY 0,Y 1,S0,L,(C) where
zj = sign
(
n∑
i=1
(−1)piyi,sji + yn+1,sjn
)
+ ν . (7.2)
The vector Z is defined as Z = [z1 . . . zn], S
j = [sj1 . . . s
j
n+1] and S
j = Ln(Sj−1) such
that Ln denotes n-iterations of the LFSR function. The variables ν and pi are defined
as in Definition 4.2.1.
We utilize these definitions in the following sections in order to derive a new
authentication protocol.
7.2 A 2-Level Noisy PUF Authentication Scheme
Standalone PUF circuits may not provide adequate protection against active attacks.
Suppose a PUF-based authentication protocol is used as the security measure for an
RFID tag. An attacker can easily send challenges to the tag and receive the response
from it, without being detected. Utilizing only a small number of challenge-response
pairs, the attacker can develop a linear model of the PUF circuit with the technique
outlined in Chapter 4. Adding some level of noise to the output of the PUF circuit
by flipping a fraction of the response bits before sending it back to the reader will
make it harder for an attacker to obtain the linear model. However, the system will
still be modelable.
In [28], the authors note that PUFs may be vulnerable to modeling and differ-
ential attacks in the original configuration. Therefore, the authors propose to apply
a cryptographic hash function to the output of the PUF circuit to eliminate such
attacks. However, the introduction of the cryptographic hash function adds signif-
icantly to the footprint and power consumption. A hash function is a challenging
cryptographic primitive to serialize. Therefore, reducing the gate count might not be
feasible. In [27], feed forward arbiters were proposed to introduce non-linearity into
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the PUF scheme. This approach seems promising. However, since the feed forward
PUF are not known to be modelable, one would need to collect a large number of
challenge-response pairs for every PUF circuit and store them in a database. This is
the classical approach proposed in the early literature on PUF. This solution becomes
less practical when the number of devices deployed becomes massive. In this section
we attempt to present a scheme which addresses these three concerns: security, circuit
size and scalability.
As pointed out earlier, a PUF device is inherently noisy due to the small varia-
tions in the circuit’s physical properties. In the original PUF scheme, this noise is
eliminated by implementing majority voting. Even with such a scheme, there will be
an unavoidable level of noise in the system. This noise will not make the PUF more
secure. In [8], the authors introduce a polynomial time algorithm for solving noisy
linear threshold functions similar to the one implemented in a PUF. In addition, there
has been a considerable amount of work in the area of learning threshold functions.
These results show that most variations of the linear threshold functions are learnable
in polynomial time. However, there are a number of elegant results showing that a
2-level threshold function would be hard to learn under certain assumptions. We will
thoroughly discuss these results in Section 7.3. In this section it suffices to point out
that these results are the main motivation for the following scheme.
We propose using a noisy SPB with the output connected to a noisy PUF. In short
we will refer to this noisy PUF as the output PUF. Note that the overall system will
be a mapping {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. For security purposes we control the input of the
system. In particular, the input of the SPB is generated by a True Random Number
Generator (TRNG). This generator will produce a uniformly random n-bit string B
which will be fed to the SPB. Recall from Definition 1 that the PUF first transforms
its input C into the vector P where P = UC. This property of the PUF can cause a
large error propagation. Therefore, we choose to implement U−1 before sending the
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output of the SPB T into the output PUF. Fortunately, U−1 has a very simple form,
and can be implemented using n− 1 XOR gates. In particular, let T ′ = U−1T , then
t′i = ti ⊕ ti+1, and t′n = tn1. Finally T ′ is XOR-ed with the incoming challenge C
to generate the input of the output PUF which produces the response bit R. The
proposed scheme is shown in Figure 7.1. We now formally define the scheme.
Definition 7.2.1. A 2-level authentication function f is a function characterized by
the vectors Y 0, Y 1, Y out ∈ Rn+1, the noise parameter  ∈ (0, 1
2
)
, the initial bit string
S0 ∈ {0, 1}n and the LFSR function L. Such that yi,0, yi,1, youti ∈ N(0, 1). Where
fY 0,Y 1,Y out,S0,L,(B,C) : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1} such that
fY 0,Y 1,Y out,S0,L,(B,C) = PUFY out,
(
U−1 (SPBY 0,Y 1,S0,L,(B))⊕ C
)
. (7.3)
LFSR U−1
PUF
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Figure 7.1: A 2-level Authentication Circuit
To assess the proposed scheme, we note that the size of the implementation will
be significantly smaller than that of a cryptographic hash function. It is not hard to
see the simplicity of the components involved in such an implementation. We leave
the security assessment of this scheme to Section 7.3. This leaves us with the final
criterion in our assessment: the ability to build an accurate model of the system.
1This issue can be avoided by using a tristate buffer implementation of a PUF given in Chapter
4.
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This is a very sensitive aspect, since we would like the owner of the device to be able
to model the system while at the same time preventing an attacker from achieving
the same goal.
As we will see in Section 7.3, it will be hard to model the presented scheme.
However, we provide an alternative means which would allow the owner of the PUF
to initially model the system before completely eliminating such ability. In particular,
we require a set and a reset control on the flip-flops inside the LFSR of the SPB. Using
these inputs we can set the LFSR to start in one of three possible states: the all zeros
state 0n, the all ones state 1n and the initial state S0. Note that the 0n state is a
fixed point for any LFSR function, meaning that the state will not change regardless
of the LFSR operation. Now, if we chose the LFSR function L so that the 1n state is
also a fixed point for L, we will be able to model the circuit. Making the 1n state a
fixed point of L is very simple. All we have to do is to require the L function to have
an odd number of terms in its connection polynomial. To model the system we start
by setting the state of the LFSR to the 0n state. This would reduce the SPB into
a circuit implementing the same PUF function PUFY 0,(B) for all n rounds. Recall
that B is a random input fed into the SPB. Now, since the SPB is implementing the
same PUF function for the n rounds, the n output bits of the SPB will be the same
except for about n bits affected by the noise. This output T will be XOR-ed with
the challenge C. However, since the challenge is externally fed to the circuit, we can
choose C = 0n for all the modeling rounds. This means that the challenge input to
the output PUF will be T .
Although we do not know the specific parameter Y out which describes the output
PUF, we do know that its input T will either contain (1 − )n zeros if the output
of PUFY 0,(B) = 0, or (1 − )n ones if the output of PUFY 0,(B) = 1. The two
types of possible inputs will have a Hamming distance larger than (1 − 2)n and
will therefore with a very high probability produce an opposite output on the output
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PUF.2 This observation will allow us to collect a number of noisy challenge-response
pairs for PUFY 0,. Using the algorithm presented in [8], we can easily solve for Y
0.
Repeating the same process, only this time using the 1n state for the LFSR, we can
similarly solve for Y 1. The LFSR function L and the state S0 were both pre-chosen.
Now, with the knowledge of Y 0 and Y 1 we will have a model for the SPB. Next, we
set the state of the LFSR back to S0, and then permanently disable the set/reset
logic for the LFSR. Finally, since the output of the SPB is modelable, we can collect
challenge-response pairs for the output PUF, therefore solving for Y out. With this
last step we will have completely modeled the 2-level authentication scheme.
Fortunately, an attacker will not be able to carry out the same process. When
we disable the set/reset logic we are essentially logically isolating the system. Any
changes that an attacker wishes to introduce to the system will have to physically
target the implementation. With three PUF circuits inside the implementation, we
can be assured that any tampering will drastically change the response of the au-
thentication circuit. Even the register storing the state Si will be located between
the two PUF circuits. Any attempts to affect the register will also affect the internal
delays of the PUF circuits. Hence, we can assume the register to be tamper-proof.
The properties of the PUF circuit renders the authentication circuit as a black-box
to the attacker. The only information available about the system will be the triple
(B,C, fY 0,Y 1,Y out,S0,L,(B,C)).
Any 2-level authentication circuit we wish to enroll in the network will have to go
through the modeling process. Once the device is enrolled and deployed in the field,
the 2-level PUF authentication protocol given in Table 7.1 is used to authenticate the
device. In the protocol, P represents the PUF enabled tag which is characterized by
(Y 0, Y 1, Y out, S0, L, ) as in Definition 7.2.1, D represents the authentication server
such as a card reader, and finally f denotes the allowable error in the authentication
2See Proposition 4.2.1 for a rigorous statement of this fact.
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Protocol 3: 2-level noisy PUF Authentication
1. P randomly generates the n-bit string B, and sends it to D.
2. D picks a random n-bit string C and sends it to P .
3. P receives the challenge C, and then calculates
R = fY 0,Y 1,Y out,S0,L,(B,C).
4. P sends the bit R to D.
5. Steps 1 through 4 are repeated for k iterations.
6. D accepts P iff the number of errors in the responses R
is not more than fk.
Table 7.1: 2-level-PUF authentication
protocol3.
7.3 Security Analysis
In the previous sections we pointed out that a PUF-based circuit is highly sensitive.
This property makes it almost impossible to access the internals of the circuit without
causing a change to the parameters. However, we saw in Chapter 4 that collecting a
number of challenge-response pairs can render a PUF circuit modelable (or learnable),
even in the presence of noise [8]. Our goal in this section is to show that under certain
assumptions the authentication scheme proposed in this chapter can be secure. In
order to do so, we review a number of results on the learnability of threshold functions.
We start by defining a number of terms. A Linear Threshold Function (LTF)
or a halfspace is essentially a boolean function f(x) = sign(
∑n
i=1(−1)xiyi + yn+1).
Note that this definition is equivalent to Equation (4.3) without the noise parameter
ν. Therefore, we can say that a noiseless PUF is essentially an LTF. Just like a
3This value will depend on  and will be derived in Lemma 7.3.4 of Section 7.3.
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PUF the LTF is characterized by a real vector Y ∈ Rn+1, where the threshold is
the yn+1 variable. For our purposes we encoded the output of an LTF into a binary
{0, 1} rather than {−1, 1} as done in the literature. We will use the term LTF and
halfspace interchangeably to mean the same thing. We say that f is an n-dimensional
halfspace if it takes inputs from {0, 1}n. Learning such a function is one of the oldest
solved problems in machine learning [2]. As we pointed out earlier, it is possible
to learn halfspaces even in the presence of simple classification noise [8]. A light
halfspace is a halfspace in which the sum of the magnitudes of the weights yi is
bounded by a polynomial in n. Note that since PUFs are halfspaces which arise
from natural phenomena they will be light halfspaces. A majority function or gate
is an LTF with threshold equal to 0 and with all the yi values equal to 1. The
output of a majority gate will be equal to one iff the majority of the input bits are
one. Otherwise, the output will be zero. When the input is an n-bit string the
majority gate can sometimes act on a subset of these n bits. Therefore, the majority
gates can be described by the vector X ∈ {0, 1}n, where xi = 1 means that the ith
input bit is acted on by the majority gate. We call the vector X a descriptor for
the majority function. So for example, if n = 5 and the majority gate descriptor is
X = 01101, then the majority gate will only compute the majority of bits 2, 3 and 5.
The intersection of halfspaces is the logical AND of the outputs of a number of LTFs.
We say that a boolean function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is PAC-learnable (Probably and
Approximately Correct) [97] if there is an algorithm A that when given  ∈ (0, 1) and
poly(n, 1
δ
) samples (x, f(x)) where x ∈ {0, 1}n and is drawn according to a probability
distribution D, A produces the function h, such that Prx∈D [h(x) 6= f(x)] < δ where
A does not know f . If D is the uniform distribution, we say that the algorithm A
PAC-learns f under the uniform distribution. We say that an algorithm can learn in
the presence of  classification noise if it can learn from samples (x, f(x) + ν) where
ν = 1 with probability  and zero otherwise. One last term to introduce is proper
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learning, in which the algorithm A is required to output a function h that has the
same form as the unknown function f . When this condition is not posed, we refer to
the learning process as non-proper learning. It should be clear that proper learning
is a harder constraint on the learning algorithms. Therefore, hardness results for
non-proper learning are in general considered as stronger results.
Our main focus is on 2-level LTF circuits. This problem has been well studied in
the literature. In [10] it is shown that properly learning a two level threshold function
with two input nodes that are LTFs and one output node which is also an LTF is NP-
complete. In [56] the authors show that in general non-proper learning of a d-level
threshold function is as hard as breaking the RSA algorithm, detecting quadratic
residues and factoring Blum integers. These results are with respect to an unknown
distribution. However, in [58], the author strengthens the results to hold under the
uniform distribution. In [59], the authors show an exponential time algorithm to learn
a two level threshold circuit under the uniform distribution. When the second level is
any n-to-1 boolean function, the algorithm runs in complexity exponential in k (the
number of nodes of the first level). For special cases when the input nodes take as
inputs disjoint sets of all the n inputs, and the second level functions are majority or
AND functions, the proposed algorithm runs in exponential time in log(k). In [25] the
authors show that under the assumption that the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem [37] is
secure, then there is no weak non-proper PAC-learning algorithm for polynomial-sized
majority gate circuits of depth 2. A similar result was obtained in [60] in which the
authors show that non-proper learning of a polynomial-sized 2-level majority gate
circuit is at least as hard as the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) and the Shortest
Independent Vector Problem (SIVP) for an approximation factor of O˜(n1.5). Note
that these two problems are believed to be hard for this particular approximation
factor [85]. The results obtained apply for a special distribution that is imposed by
the reduction. The authors also show that non-proper learning of the intersection
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of n light n-dimensional halfspaces for  > 0 is at least as hard as the O˜(n1.5)-SVP
and O˜(n1.5)-SIVP problems. Finally in [61] the authors show that in the statistical
query model [55] any algorithm for non-proper learning of the intersection of
√
n
halfspaces which are n-dimensional will require at least 2
√
n queries. To understand
the importance of the statistical query model, note that in [55] the author shows that
any class of functions efficiently learnable from statistical queries is also efficiently
learnable with classification noise.
Motivated by these results we make the following initial assumption.
Assumption 7.3.1. There does not exist a randomized polynomial-time algorithm
which can PAC-learn any threshold of n n-dimensional halfspaces under the uniform
distribution in the presence of  classification noise, where  ∈ (0, 1
2
).
When we say threshold of halfspaces, we basically mean a threshold of thresholds.
Note that the majority and the AND functions are both weaker than a threshold
function [35]. Assumption 7.3.1 has only been proven under strong cryptographic
assumptions for certain distributions. Therefore, the main aspect to be proven about
the assumption becomes learning under uniform distribution. In [61] the authors
report progress on this particular problem. Also note that most of these results do
not take the noise into account. The setup in the assumption is in fact identical
to the 2-Level authentication function of Definition 4, except that we need to use a
PUF-box rather than an SPB. In particular, we can say that a 2-Level authentication
scheme using a PUF-box for its first level is a threshold of n n-dimensional halfspaces.
The only difference is that the assumption does not specify the distribution on the
thresholds. It seems that when the thresholds are Gaussian, learning under the
uniform distribution will look like learning under the Gaussian distribution. This
would mean that any bounds used in the Gaussian case can be applied to the PUF
case. Note that the problem will still be hard in this case [57].
Recall that we are interested in lightweight solutions. Therefore, we will use a
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stronger assumption. We start with the following definition.
Definition 7.3.1. Let G1, . . . ,Gn be n different majority gates, such that Xi ∈ {0, 1}n
is the descriptor for Gi. Let X ∈ {0, 1}n2 where X = [X1 . . . Xn] be the combined
descriptor of the n majority gates. We say that the n majority gates described by
X have a Linear Complexity4description of n, if there exists an LFSR L of length n
which generates X .
The definition captures the complexity of describing n-majority gates. It is clear
that such a description would require n2 bits as seen in the definition. However, we
are interested in the cases when the description can be compressed such that an LFSR
can generate the entire sequence. Now we state the following assumption.
Assumption 7.3.2. There does not exist a randomized polynomial-time algorithm
which can PAC-learn any threshold of n-majority functions having a linear complexity
description of n, where the algorithm learns under the uniform distribution in the
presence of  classification noise, with  ∈ (0, 1
2
).
It should be clear that the added linear complexity condition on the majority gates
is added to serve the SPB. This condition can be relaxed if we allow the LFSR to be
of length n
2
2
[87]. This assumption is stronger than Assumption 7.3.1. Recall from
the previous results [59] that when a number of majority gates act on disjoint inputs,
there exist quasi polynomial-time algorithms to learn the AND and the majority
functions of these majorities. Of course the restriction we add in Assumption 7.3.2
is much weaker than the restriction required to obtain these quasi polynomial-time
algorithms. Also we need to keep in mind that a 2-level polynomial-size majority
gate circuit is in general hard to learn. Another aspect of Assumption 7.3.2 is that it
takes classification noise into consideration. In general, our assumption is based on
4The Linear Complexity (LC) of a bit sequence X, is the length of the shortest LFSR which
generates X [75].
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the general hardness of learning 2-level noisy majority and LTF functions. Next, we
prove a reduction from our scheme to the problem in Assumption 7.3.2.
Theorem 7.3.3. Say there exists a polynomial-time randomized algorithm A that can
PAC-learn any 2-level authentication function fY 0,Y 1,Y out,S0,L, as in Definition 4, with
 ∈ (0, 1
8
), where A is a passive5 algorithm which learns under the uniform distribution
in the presence of f classification noise. Then there exists a randomized polynomial-
time algorithm A′ which can PAC-learn any threshold of n-majority functions having
a linear complexity description of n and denoted by MYM ,X ,f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, such
that Y M ∈ Rn+1 characterizes the threshold function of M , and X = [X1 . . . Xn]
where Xi ∈ {0, 1}n is the descriptor for the ith majority function in M , where A′
learns under the uniform distribution in the presence of f classification noise.
Proof. We describe how to use A to produce the algorithm A′. When the algorithm A
tries to learn the function fY 0,Y 1,Y out,S0,L, it expects to receive a polynomial number of
triplets (Bi, Ci, Ri = fY 0,Y 1,Y out,S0,L,(Bi, Ci)) where Bi is chosen uniformly at random.
Let (Hi,MYM ,X (Hi)) denote the samples presented to the algorithm A′ in order to
learn MYM ,X ,f . Now, A
′ starts running A by simulating the triplet A needs to
receive. The way A′ does this is by setting all the challenges Ci = 0n, it then feeds
the algorithm A with (Hi, 0
n, Ri = MYM ,X (Hi)). Note that Hi will be uniformly
random since we are trying to learn under the uniform distribution. Now A′ simply
takes the solution function returned by A and uses it as the solution function for
MYM ,X ,f .
To show that this will actually work, we demonstrate that MYM ,X ,f is in fact
an instance of fY 0,Y 1,Y out,S0,L,. Set Y
out = Y M , Y 0 = 0n+1 and Y 1 = [1n 0] where
we made y1n+1 = 0. Using the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm [75] generate the n-
bit LFSR function L′ and the n-bit initial state S ′ which produces the bit string
5Passive means that A only sees transcripts of the authentication session, rather than being able
to interact with the protocol, in which case it would be able to choose C.
7.3. SECURITY ANALYSIS 129
X = [X1 . . . Xn]. Such an LFSR and an initial state exist from the assumption that
X has a linear complexity of n. Now set L = L′ and S0 = S ′. After every n iterations
the LFSR will output Xi, which will in turn control the switches inside the SPB.
Note that because of the way Y 0 and Y 1 are setup, in every iteration the SPB will
be implementing the majority gate described by Xi. Therefore the output fed to the
output PUF will be that of the n-majority gates described by X . The output PUF
will be identical to the threshold function characterized by Y M . Finally, the noise of
the entire system f will depend on the noise parameter . As will be shown in Lemma
7.3.4 for  < 1
8
we have f ∈ (0, 12). Therefore MYM ,X ,f = f0n+1,[1n 0],YM ,S′,L′,.
It should be clear that the above is a worst case reduction. The last thing we need
to do in order to complete this section, is to show how the error  in each of the 3 PUFs
inside the 2-level authentication function fY 0,Y 1,Y out,S0,L, will propagate to the final
output R. To quantify the error propagation in the 2-level authentication function we
assume the error that is produced by the SPB to be independent between the different
rounds. This a reasonable assumption since the error depends on environmental
variations that are independent of the round number. Similarly, we assume the error
produced by the SPB to be independent of the error produced by the output PUF.
With these assumptions we can now prove the following lemma.
Lemma 7.3.4. The expected overall classification noise in the 2-level authentication
function fY 0,Y 1,Y out,S0,L, of Definition 4 will be f <
4
pi
arctan
(√

1−
)
.
Proof. Let the output of the SPB inside fY 0,Y 1,Y out,S0,L, be T ∈ {0, 1}n. Because we
assumed the error occurs independently, the number of errors which are expected to
be found in T will belong to a Binomial distribution B(n, ). Recall that in Definition
4 we use the transformation U−1 before injecting the output of the SPB to the output
PUF. Therefore, we will have P = T .6 Now we can use Proposition 4.2.1, with d as
6See the definition of P in Proposition 4.2.1.
130 CHAPTER 7. TWO LEVEL PUFS
a random variable following B(n, ). Assume for now that the output PUF has 0%
noise. In such a case the expected noise in the output of the entire circuit will be
s = 1−
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
()i(1− )n−i
(
1− 2
pi
arctan
(√
i
n+ 1− i
))
≤ 1− Fn(n)
≤ 1− Fn−1(n) = 2
pi
arctan
(√

1− 
)
Now we take into consideration the noise  which will occur in the output PUF. An
overall error will appear on the output of fY 0,Y 1,Y out,S0,L, iff the error caused by the
output PUF and the error caused by the noise in the input to the output PUF do not
coincide. As we assumed earlier the error in T and the error caused by the output
PUF are two independent events. Therefore we have
f = (1− s) + s(1− ) < 2 s = 4
pi
arctan
(√

1− 
)
This lemma explains why in Theorem 7.3.3 we needed the error  ∈ (0, 1
8
) in order
to have f <
1
2
. Note that f =
1
2
is the information theoretic limit on the amount of
allowable noise. In general, the choice of a noise parameter will control the number of
rounds k used in an authentication session. A reasonable parameter would be for f
to be around 0.25. To get a sense of the error propagation in general, for the typical
noise values achieved in a PUF circuit we have  = 3% which would yield an upper
limit of f < 23% on the 2-level authentication function noise.
7.4 Summary
We presented a tamper-proof and lightweight challenge-response authentication scheme
based on 2-level noisy PUFs. The proposed authentication scheme may be imple-
mented in a very small footprint and deployed in applications with stringent power
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limitations. Furthermore, the inherent properties of PUFs provide strong tamper-
resilience – a feature crucial for applications where the device is in the hand of poten-
tial attackers. From a computational security point to view the 2-level PUF scheme
is weaker than PUF-HB and HB+PUF. The real advantage of the 2-level scheme is
that all the secrets are PVs which makes the possibility of detecting any tampering
more realistic.
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Chapter 8
Summary
The work in this dissertation mainly revolved around exploring applications of PVs.
Following is a summary of our contributions.
• The limits of using Gaussian PVs as identifying PVs are explored. As the most
natural form of a PV, Gaussian PVs provide a convenient vehicle to rigorously
prove limits on their identification capability.
• A new CD fingerprinting technique which utilizes the manufacturing variability
in the length of the CDs’ lands and pits is presented. The novelty of the
approach is in the use of the electrical signal produced by the photo-detector
inside the CD reader.
• A mathematical framework for delay-based PUFs is re-derived. This framework
has been previously presented in a slightly different format [27]. The work here
simplifies these derivations and quantifies the probability of observing a collision
in the output of the delay-based PUF.
• A new implementation of the delay-based PUF, i.e. the tristate PUF, is pro-
posed. The new PUF implementation is shown to be equivalent to the MUX-
based delay PUF by deriving the corresponding mathematical model.
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• Two authentication protocols, PUF-HB and HB+PUF, are presented. These
protocols build on the HB authentication family and combine them with PUFs
in order to improve on the security of the typical HB protocol.
• A proof of concept implementation for HB+PUF is presented and shown to
require a few thousand gates.
• An authentication protocol based on 2-level PUFs is presented.
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